|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von Poliadversum
Ist n Video von der Sun, aber egal, das ist halt echt unfassbar:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KyrFB4pvx0s
4 (vier) Panzer in 3 (drei) Minuten zerstört.
So kommt man dann zackig auf mehrere hundert kaputte Panzer, no problemo.
| |
Die müssen aber nicht wirklich manuell "drüber" zielen um die ballistische Flugkurve auszugleichen?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ich vermute das System hat eine Steuerung, die über das (Nach-)Zielen mit der Optik funktioniert. Ein Grund dafür, dass er drüberhält, könnte sein, dass die Waffe gedeckt steht und er erst sicher die Deckung überschießen will, bevor er die Rakete ins Ziel lenkt. Ein weiterer Grund wäre, dass es vorteilhaft ist, von oben zu treffen.
Möglicherweise haben russische Panzer auch Systeme, die auf sie gerichtete Laser erkennen können, bei Luftfahrzeugen gibt es das. Ein weiterer Grund, erst in einer späteren Flugphase tatsächlich ins Ziel zu gehen.
Was mich wundert, dass selbst nach dem dritten Schuss keine Bewegung in den verbleibenden Panzer kommt. Und dass die Ukrainer keine Anstalten machen ihre Stellung zu wechseln. Wird jetzt sehr armchairig, aber ich kann mir darauf nur einen Reim machen, wenn die Panzer bereits bewegungsunfähig und aufgegeben sind.
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 2 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Abso am 29.04.2022 20:55]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
https://twitter.com/Mij_Europe/status/1520020783967444993
| | 👀
A senior EU source tells me: “Putin has now taken day-to day-control of the conflict and delegated the running of Russia to the Prime Minister” | |
https://twitter.com/EliotACohen/status/1520055944402685952
| | If it is true that General Gerasimov is assuming direct command of combat operations in Ukraine from a forward headquarters there are, as ever, two possibilities.
The first is that as the Russians launch the decisive maneuver(s) of the war, they want their very best field commander to complete these heroic tasks, orchestrating fire and maneuver, land air and sea as only a superb field commander can. And obviously, he’s the best!
The second is that maybe he is not the reincarnation of Suvorov, Zhukov, etc. but a guy who has been the top staff job for over a decade. And things are going badly. Maybe very badly. Or at least potentially very badly.
One cannot blame the Boss for having launched this incredibly stupid war that will leave Russia weakened, isolated, with a stronger and larger NATO on its doorstep, particularly if you lose it to those Ukrainian peasants!
So you send the Chief of the General Staff to the front with the message, “Fix this or don’t come home.” You now have a really good person to blame (nobody has ever heard of Dvornikov anyway). And at this point, you’re not worried about a successful general launching a coup because this thing may be an epic disaster. So you need a really good scapegoat.
As always truth may well lie somewhere in between, but I bet on #2. No reason to think Gerasimov is, in fact, likely to be a skilled theater commander plus issues @WarintheFuture points out. | |
https://twitter.com/shashj/status/1520050202442407937
| | [Thread] Western officials on the Russia-Ukraine war, afternoon of April 29th:
...
Wester officials on problems with Russian targeting: "They've got a lack of strategic intelligence [see next tweet] and the ability to employ their ... intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance [ISR] assets is very limited because of the threat posed by Ukrainian air defence". "we're...seeing an awful lot of the Russian forces using quite antiquated mapping, and in some cases using mapping from the 1970s which of course doesn't in any way represent the sort of target set that they're attempting to prosecute in Ukraine." ...
Western officials on Russian casualties: "we're seeing a slowing down in the level of Russian casualties...the overall numbers are reducing, but the level of casualties that we're seeing in terms of those areas where they are engaging Ukrainian forces are still...quite high." Ukraine "taking some losses [but] certainly not at the sort of scale [of] Russian forces. Also: "losses on Russian forces were assessed to be having a significant impact on the will to fight of wider Russian forces...Ukrainian losses are not affecting...morale"
Western officials on Russian civil-military relations: "one of the biggest challenges, at the operational level, is that...political interference in the execution of military operations has been significant", e.g. "insisting upon objectives being achieved by particular dates."
Western officials on Russian learning in Donbas: "we are seeing are some quite long, introspective moments where people are asking lots of questions about how this has all gone quite so badly wrong & how might they fix it." Sign of "some adaptions" but many problems to fix. | |
https://twitter.com/JackDetsch/status/1520102393328906240
| | U.S. has seen continued indications of poor morale, discouragement, and lack of unit cohesion in the Russian military: Pentagon Press Secretary John Kirby
Russia's military is 40 % conscripts. "First contact with the enemy, that morale is shattered," Kirby said. | |
https://twitter.com/MattSeyler/status/1520094947587805184
| | Pentagon spox announces U.S. has begun training Ukrainians in Germany on counter-battery radar systems and armored vehicles the U.S. is sending for their fight against Russia. Yesterday the Pentagon said an initial group of about 50 Ukrainians finished training on US howitzers.
There will also be other sites outside of Ukraine used for training. The bulk of the training will be done by the roughly 160 Florida National Guard trainers who were inside Ukraine and pulled shortly before the invasion began.
The reunion of the National Guardsmen and Ukrainian forces was "an emotional meeting, given the strong bonds that were formed as they were living and working together before temporarily parting ways in February," @PentagonPresSec said. | |
https://twitter.com/christogrozev/status/1520016749944524800
| | Russian mercenaries posted this comparison of a Russian soldier's first-aid kit (above) and a Ukrainian one (below).
"This is what Putin and Shoigu brought us to..", one of the commenters complain.
Well at least they have a booklet to explain what one can do with a long rubber band. | |
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 4 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Herr der Lage am 29.04.2022 20:57]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von Abso
Was mich wundert, dass selbst nach dem dritten Schuss keine Bewegung in den verbleibenden Panzer kommt. Und dass die Ukrainer keine Anstalten machen ihre Stellung zu wechseln. Wird jetzt sehr armchairig, aber ich kann mir darauf nur einen Reim machen, wenn die Panzer bereits bewegungsunfähig und aufgegeben sind.
| |
Fand ich auch interessant, eventuell sind die Panzer wie du sagst aufgegeben oder einfach in der Situation nicht bemannt (die können die Dinger ja eh nicht im Dauerbetrieb laufen lassen). Oder ne Mischung insofern als dass die Ukrainer nicht sicher wussten ob die Dinger gerade nur vorübergehend abgestellt mit Mannschaft in der Nähe oder wirklich komplett zurückgelassen.
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Poliadversum am 29.04.2022 21:11]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von Abso
Ich vermute das System hat eine Steuerung, die über das (Nach-)Zielen mit der Optik funktioniert. Ein Grund dafür, dass er drüberhält, könnte sein, dass die Waffe gedeckt steht und er erst sicher die Deckung überschießen will, bevor er die Rakete ins Ziel lenkt. Ein weiterer Grund wäre, dass es vorteilhaft ist, von oben zu treffen.
Möglicherweise haben russische Panzer auch Systeme, die auf sie gerichtete Laser erkennen können, bei Luftfahrzeugen gibt es das. Ein weiterer Grund, erst in einer späteren Flugphase tatsächlich ins Ziel zu gehen.
Was mich wundert, dass selbst nach dem dritten Schuss keine Bewegung in den verbleibenden Panzer kommt. Und dass die Ukrainer keine Anstalten machen ihre Stellung zu wechseln. Wird jetzt sehr armchairig, aber ich kann mir darauf nur einen Reim machen, wenn die Panzer bereits bewegungsunfähig und aufgegeben sind.
| |
Der Grund ist laut miltwitter dass die Rakete erst nach gewisser Flugzeit stabilisiert fliegt. Vorher "eiert" sie was ein Risiko bedeutet auf dem Boden aufzuschlagen.
Der zweite Grund nicht direkt drauf zu halten ist Laserwarnsysteme nicht zu triggern wie du schon sagtest.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
So oder so muss man das mal umrechnen, in Minuten ist ja in, das sind knapp 2000 Panzer pro Tag. Putin hat keine Chance.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von -=Q=- 8-BaLL
So oder so muss man das mal umrechnen, in Minuten ist ja in, das sind knapp 2000 Panzer pro Tag. Putin hat keine Chance.
| |
Referenz verstanden
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Das russische Fernsehen hat immer so blöde Karten für den Ausgang des Krieges, das chinesiche Fernsehen hat sich was anderes überlegt.
Haben die so gesendet
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Königsberg nicht an Deutschland zurück? Friendship with China over.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ja gut bei Kaliningrad sieht man das schwarz nicht so.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von TylerDurdan
Königsberg nicht an Deutschland zurück? Friendship with China over.
| |
Ob Bibo das noch miterleben muss?
Über Belarus müssen wir mit den Chinesen jedenfalls auch nochmal sprechen, das geht so nicht. Die hängen mit drin.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Was, was. Hat China sich schonmal die Besatzungszone ausgesucht oder was ist das?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Wer hätte bei „Zeitenwende“ dran gedacht, dass China sich mal ne Grenze mit Norwegen teilen würde, wa.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von Armag3ddon
Was, was. Hat China sich schonmal die Besatzungszone ausgesucht oder was ist das?
| |
Entweder das, oder sie wollen der eigenen Bevölkerung nur mal etwas Geographie beibringen mit Hilfe von Reddit:
The nearest country to you, when in Russia
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Herr der Lage am 29.04.2022 22:15]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Du hast es kaputtgemacht!
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ich frag mich wirklich, wie man sowas hier später mal vermitteln will, wenn Opa von 2022 erzählt.
Da tuns ja auch keine Leinwände mehr in irgendwelchen Museen (Grüße!), völlig aunabhängig vom Ausgang. Die Ukraine ist tanzend verschwunden. Oder die Ukrainer sind bis Moskau gedanct.
Mit TikTok, Bluetoothbox und Kaliberumstellung auf 155.
(Originalsound: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ac4oQs6B7LM )
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Was wären die Folgen, falls Putin am 9.5. die "Spezialoperation" zum Krieg erklärt, um mehr Leute in die Ukraine schicken zu können?
In diesem bereits erwähnten Thread warnt ein Politologe, dass das den Westen vor Probleme stellen könnte.
https://twitter.com/MMazarr/status/1519160793790656513 | Thread Reader
| | Very struck by recent analysis + reporting that highlights a risk--highly uncertain but not so far widely discussed--of a significant escalation of the Ukraine war in coming weeks. What it means, and what it implies for US policy, are not at all clear.
...
What do we make of all this? It could be RU posturing to scare off Ukraine's friends. It could reflect the views of some Russian officials, but not the key ones. It could be accurate now--and Putin could change course. But the risk of such a scenario cannot be ignored.
What happens if Putin does use May 9 to commit to nat'l mobilization to get a total win in Ukraine? In the process telling the RU people they are at war w/NATO? And if he ends restrictions on mil ops, for eg on airstrikes or covert ops vs NATO convoys + training centers?
This would create huge dilemmas for US + NATO. The US judgment so far has been that it doesn't possess vital interests sufficient for direct involvement in war. A seemingly out-of-control, hyper-nationalist RU going for broke would cause many to question that assumption. Pressures to "show credibility" and jump into the war would be intense. Alliance solidarity would be brutally tested: Who would fight? And how could EU keep buying gas from such a Russia? But if it stops, recession follows. Are EU publics along for that ride? What then do third parties do? Do US allies boost aid? What of the hedgers: Do India, Brazil, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Vietnam etc now go full-throated in condemnation of RU--or do they tilt the other way and demand that Ukraine + the West essentially give up?
This puts current US strategy in a perilous light. As @IgnatiusPost explains, the US is signaling a desire to degrade RU power in dramatic ways--a "high-stakes strategy" though one that is a reasonable alternative to direct participation in the war. Yet I disagree w/Ignatius that "The exit ramp surely must look more attractive to Putin now than it did several months ago." That assumes Putin is getting accurate info on the war's costs + prospects. It assumes he doesn't have faith in his ability to out-muscle the West. Ignatius notes that superpowers have abandoned failed wars in Vietnam + Afghanistan. But these were more marginal and only abandoned after years of brutal losses + wishful thinking. It's difficult to imagine Putin choosing an outright loss vs a dice-throw of escalation. Such a move would be a foolhardy venture w/huge risks of larger war. It's tough to see Ukraine, the US or NATO backing down, or envision any real victory for RU.
This scenario may still be unlikely; Putin has options short of mobilization, which carries big political risks. But it can't be discounted. If it happens, demands for knee-jerk US action will come thick + fast. The balancing act at the core of US strategy--support Ukraine and punish RU enough to win + enforce norms, w/o courting a larger war--will become acute + perhaps unsustainable. | |
*shrug*
https://twitter.com/EHunterChristie/status/1519456464427003905
| | I keep on feeling underwhelmed by commentary which puts great stress on fear and on escalation risks without clarity on concrete scenarios and concrete alternatives. It's simple: if Russia attacks NATO, the Alliance goes to war against Russia.
There is no dilemma.
...
So, there is no dilemma and the trajectory is already clear. We will not attack Russia. The choice of escalation is entirely with Moscow. And if they make that choice, our response will be devastating.
Keep calm and arm Ukraine.
And don't watch Russian TV. | |
Phillips P. OBrien erklärt, warum das mit der Mobilmachung nicht so einfach ist:
https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1519560504712253440 | Thread Reader
| | This is a point worth examining. We have lots of stress on what if Russia goes for societal mobilization now (normally by the way by those who argued that Russia would conquer Ukraine quickly). However, societal mobilization is not easy under the best of conditions.
Still voices speak (without evidence) that Russia is some large military power that can almost dictate terms in Ukraine. This article in @guardian might be the worst. No evidence given on Russian strength, but an assumption Russia can fight a long war.
People seem to be forgetting that societal mobilization and long war has enormous political, economic and military risks for Russia. Its not just about calling soldiers to the ranks--its about training them and equipping them. Russia is not in the best position to do this at all.
Russia has no training system to handle some mass infusion of untrained personnel. They already have called up this year's normal conscript soldiers (Only 135k because of Russia's demographic crisis) and they are right now being trained. If they want to train more--they need to set up a training system first to handle more soldiers. This normally takes many months in an efficient system. Only once you have the training system, can you start actually creating your new army.
Just as an example, it takes the US in WWII, even with preparations under way. more than 6 months to start expanding significantly its pool of trained personnel. and its not til more than a year that the numbers really take off. So the Russians need to train the trainers, then train the new soldiers. According to this @ISW report, Russian training takes somewhere between 3-6 months. ...
So under exceptionally efficient systems, you might expect a large army expansion with well trained soldiers in 9 months. Could RUssia do that--doubtful. Probably poorly trained, unmotivated conscripts could be produced, but thats it.
Then you have to equip them. Again, all this blase talk about Russia going to full mobilization misses the fact that Russia is economically weak and now operating under sanctions.
The Russians are already suffering shortfalls in replenishment. It would again take a very efficient and well planned economy to ramp up production under these sanctions. So arming the new mass army with new weapons will be hard.
Sure, they can get all their oodles of equipment that has been sitting around in storage for years, not being maintained, etc. Their front line stuff has already shown weaknesses. Imagine what the second-line stuff is like.
So Russian mobilization requires the establishment of a training system that doesnt exist and the growth of arms production that is being crippled. It would also require an admission by the Russian government that they are losing the war. Thats a political risk.
It's interesting to note that when they called up this year's conscripts, they said they would not be sent to Ukraine. There are stories of Russian army recruitment stations being burned too. Will people actually want to fight and die in this war? Questionable.
And while the Russians are assembling this force of hastily untrained, not well equipped, and politically questionable conscripts to fight in a war that they have been calling a great success--the Ukrainians will be getting more and better equipment from NATO.
Ukraine is already upgrading its training and will beat the Russians to the punch by getting better prepared soldiers to the front lines months earlier--and thats if Russia acts now.
So understand Russian societal mobilization is not something that can be simply bandied about. It requires action and preparation that the Russian government is clearly reluctant to do. Stop talking about it like its easy and Russia is some large power. Neither is true.
And Russia has to start now. Waiting till May 9 is even too late. Ukraine has already started its societal mobilisation in training and equipment.
Interesting time reference by Pres Biden in the announcement of the massive $33billon aid package. Wants to make sure Ukraine has significant success within 5 months. Ie before Russia could do a wide scale mobilisation, were it so inclined. | |
https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1520111990378745857
| | | The Chinese must be watching the Russians threaten nuclear war, backtrack, then threaten nuclear war and talk about going to heaven and say, ‘we chose to back this regime?’ | |
https://twitter.com/edwardstrngr/status/1520062123413409793 | Thread Reader
| | A few thoughts triggered by the prevalence of heuristics - instinctive, learned responses - especially w.r.t. assumptions of mass and might. Principally the enduring assumption that Russia has latent capital reserves of mass it can 'liquidise' into combat power. The FT published a 'long read' that demonstrates such thinking, citing "western officials" who reveal that Russia will get its act together militarily when it fights "as they were trained to fight". This is a heuristic response. So can Russia do that?
It is increasingly difficult to see Russia being able to mobilise a large reserve much within a year. So its troops in the Donbas are what it has. (There are lessons here for general assumptions on generating mass: if even Russia cannot...)
Most estimates place >80K RUS troops in BTGs against >40K UKR in good defensive positions. This is not a good ratio for any attacking force - even with firepower. But can it 'fight like its doctrine' under its new, centralised commander: Dvornikov?
My own experience makes me sceptical that he & it can. 5Eyes Generals will admit only the US Army can train effectively at Corps or Army level - and it is complicated, hard, and needs repeated exercising to master. Mark Hertling gives a flavour: ... Also, Dvornikov will need to build a C2 apparatus for his new, huge, command. How will he fuse the previous regional C2? Will he take the southern command and expand it to sit above, or build anew? How will he train the staff for it?
And that decades old, corrupt & bankrupt RUS military culture is not going to change overnight. Yes, the Darwinian instinct will teach the BTGs how to be less vulnerable, but don't expect great flourishes of manouevre warfare.
And then there is the logistics. Fast armoured warfare relies on equal dash from the loggies. We just don't see it. And every mile further into UKR territory is another vulnerability from extension, and exposure to a hostile pop'n.
Russia is caught between needing a lightning offensive campaign to achieve a bold victory, and not being able or capable enough to risk its remaining force in such a move. It has neither the assumed mass of the East nor the skill of the West.
So when you see maps with dramatic, pincing arrows suggesting RUS' next move, think on what each of those easy to draw symbols means in all-arms manoeuvre, logistic support, and then holding the territory taken.
UKR must work out how much ground it is willing to trade while writing down RUS through attrition. Some assess UKR now has more tanks. But it needs more long-range artillery, and a CONOPs for going on the offensive eventually with smaller numbers. Which is why the Biden administrations announcement of $33Bn is so significant. It has bought time for UKR to work out what its modern CONOPs and theory of victory looks like, as long as it can contain current RUS pressure.
Two things remain. The threat of nuclear weapons should retain its awe. But proper statecraft can manage this as long as NATO does not get directly involved, ie the escalation remains sub-strategic. See ... And to best do that NATO must ensure it does not get directly involved, where a route to an existential rationale for RUS is easier to draw. Our rhetoric on these two points needs to be careful and deliberate.
But my overall conclusion has not changed. There is no room for complacency, but a well-sustained UKR can prevail and defeat the invasion of its territory. It is in everyone's interests that it does, and the US has just put down a big bet. | |
https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1518604757149143040 | Thread Reader
| | A few folks suggested I've been "bold" in some of my predictions accompanying the analysis I've provided on @CNN regarding this conflict.
Beyond tactical assessments, there are 2 primary reasons I've said Ukraine would win this fight.
Here's a short thread on why I say this.
...
| |
https://twitter.com/EliotACohen/status/1518661777025818625
| | This excellent thread by @MarkHertling got me thinking about a question: why has the analysis of this war by retired generals such as him, @general_ben and @edwardstrngr, and first rate military historians such as @PhillipsPOBrien been superior to that of the Russian military analytic community?
This requires serious research, & am helping launch some, because its an important question. But here are some initial hypotheses:
...
| |
--
Nach bisher noch unbestätigten Berichten schickt Putin seinen obersten General in die Ukraine.
Vladimir Putin’s military chief moves towards war zone to try to boost Russian advances on Donbas
| | Vladimir Putin’s military chief General Valery Gerasimov is thought to be going forward towards the war zone because Russia’s military campaign in eastern Ukraine is struggling so badly, western officials said on Friday.
...
[Western official:] “We saw (Alexander) Dvornikov put in overall command.
“If Gerasimov has come forward, even if not to take command but in order to get some momentum behind the assaults and the attacks, that’s a real statement of the challenges which Russian forces are facing in the Donbas.
“We are yet to see confirmation as to quite what role he is going to play but the idea that you would send the head of your military forces forward to take control, were that to be the case, that would be another acceptance of the overall failure of their operations.
“I think it most likely, though, that Dvornikov will likely remain the Commander-in-Chief for these operations and that Gerasimov is there to impose authority and insert momentum into the move.” | |
Beau of the Fifth Column: Let's talk about Gerasimov, the most sought after man in the world...
| | This is the Gerasimov of the "Gerasimov doctrin". ...
Ukraine's smartest move would be to counter him with anything and everything they could. Ukraine has been very successful at forcing Russian generals to remove themselves from the battlefield rapidly, and they will probably try to do that, and they will be most certainly encouraged to do that by NATO. ...
I wouldn't want to be anywhere near this guy, because there are going to be a whole lot of different agencies, governments and forces that are going to be looking to drop something on his head. ...
I would imagine that the amount of resouces that are currently being devoted to
a) confirming that this is actually happening
b) finding him and
c) making sure that he doesn't go home are immense. | |
--
https://twitter.com/tkesho3/status/1520117348891570177
| | | Arrested in Russia for “holding invisible anti-government banners” - verbatim from the detention protocols | |
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 3 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Herr der Lage am 30.04.2022 5:41]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Lauter blinde bei der Polizei. Ich she da eindeutig ein unsichtbares Z.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von Icefeldt
| | Zitat von Poliadversum
Ist n Video von der Sun, aber egal, das ist halt echt unfassbar:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KyrFB4pvx0s
4 (vier) Panzer in 3 (drei) Minuten zerstört.
So kommt man dann zackig auf mehrere hundert kaputte Panzer, no problemo.
| |
Die müssen aber nicht wirklich manuell "drüber" zielen um die ballistische Flugkurve auszugleichen?
| |
Steht doch in den Kommentaren. Die Zielen mit ihrem laser über das Ziel und erst im letzten Moment gehen sie auf das Ziel, weil die Russen was haben, was den laserpunkt detektiert und dann noch reagieren könnten.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Raik Anders:
Putin: "Ukraine hat kein Existenzrecht"
Zelensky: "Wir würden gern existieren"
Dieter Nuhr, Juli Zeh & Co:
"Trefft euch doch in der Mitte! "
Rad ab.
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von KarlKoch am 30.04.2022 8:09]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Danke übrigens an HdL für die regelmäßige Lieferung guten Contents. Viele gute Quellen dadurch erschlossen, die den Krieg verständlicher machen.
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Buxxbaum am 30.04.2022 9:18]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | | Pope Francis reached out to Putin three times asking to allow the ship with a Vatican flag to evacuate civilians trapped in Mariupol's Azovstal steel mill, but all three times his requests were rejected, according to the Italian newspaper Il Messaggero | |
https://twitter.com/olgatokariuk/status/1520150234470494210
Und mit so jemand soll der Westen verhandeln laut Linke und den Todes-Lost-C-Promis? Wie denn bitte?
| | | The typically stoic Pentagon spokesman John Kirby gets choked up talking about the images of Russian "depravity" coming out of Ukraine. | |
https://twitter.com/CaitlinDoornbos/status/1520111437087223808
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ich würde jetzt gerne das "Are we the baddies" Meme posten, aber im ersten Post steht keine Memes. Aber es würde sehr gut passen.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von Mobius
Ich würde jetzt gerne das "Are we the baddies" Meme posten, aber im ersten Post steht keine Memes. Aber es würde sehr gut passen.
| |
Langsam wird das schwierig zu differenzieren. Sind mit Musik unterlegte Videos von russischen Panzern, die zerstört werden noch Berichte oder schon Memes?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Diesmal ist der Typo Ukreine, nicht Ringo Rumms
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von [Muh!]Shadow
Diesmal ist der Typo Ukreine, nicht Ringo Rumms
| |
Haben Sie den "Gerpard" also schon korrigiert? 
¤ Kirsche auf der Sahne: Sie schreiben dafür den Namen ihres EIGENEN Redakteurs falsch
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von [Amateur]Cain am 30.04.2022 15:05]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Gepard hilft vorallem gegen Flugzeuge/Dronen soweit ich verstanden hab, aber mal ne dumme Frage, soweit ich verstanden hab setzt Russland gerne und viel auf Artillerie und Raketen, gibts da überhaupt effektive Gegenmaßnahmen / haben wir welche / hat die Ukraine welche?
Sowas wie Israel's Iron Dome?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Thema: Allgemeine Diskussion zum Ukraine Krieg |
![AUP [Muh!]Shadow 10.03.2015](./avatare/upload/U50324--muhshadownewversion3kyhuza.png)
