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https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1525704460214878208
| Russia’s Donbas offensive has lost momentum and fallen significantly behind schedule. Despite small-scale initial advances, Russia has failed to achieve substantial territorial gains over the past month whilst sustaining consistently high levels of attrition.
Russia has now likely suffered losses of one third of the ground combat force it committed in February.
These delays will almost certainly be exacerbated by the loss of critical enablers such as bridging equipment and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance drones. ...
Russian forces are increasingly constrained by degraded enabling capabilities, continued low morale and reduced combat effectiveness. Many of these capabilities cannot be quickly replaced or reconstituted, and are likely to continue to hinder Russian operations in Ukraine.
Under the current conditions, Russia is unlikely to dramatically accelerate its rate of advance over the next 30 days. | |
https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1525748588445302784
| Battle of the Donbas update, some thoughts on what happened the past week and where things might be heading. Looks like we are seeing drastically reduced Russian goals, though even then might be unobtainable. And Russian Army heading for major trouble over the summer.
First, the Russians have severely restricted their offensive activity to now a very small pocket between Popasna and Severodonetsk. ...
This represents an extreme rolling back of Russian goals in the Donbas, from a large encirclement to basically a mini-me snipping off of a salient. ...
The reason for scaling back is probably the Russians running out of the equipment--the attrition in the Donbas, and all of Ukraine, continues on. Here are three day average charts for tanks and APCs since the start of the battle (will explain red lines next).
To see just how destructive the daily attritional losses are for the Russians, the red lines represent the peaks for APC and Tank losses that the Ukrainians seem to register when listing Russian losses during the failed river crossing of a few days ago.
In other words, the losses suffered during this catastrophe didnt even raise Russian losses close to what they were earlier in the Battle of the Donbas. Russian forces have basically suffered something to the river disaster repeatedly since April 24.
These equipment losses have to be taking a toll--particularly when you look at the report last night which showed how the Ukrainians have destroyed a disproportionate number of Russian trucks and logistics vehicles.
Guess is that even if the Russian army could stage some kind of breakout (which looks beyond their capabilities) they could not exploit it regardless as they lack now the lift capability to support advancing forces. Instead all they can do is battle forward a little at a time.
So Battle of the Donbas seems to be subsiding a little as Russian losses lead to them drastically reducing their goals--even with the withdrawal from Kharkiv. Of course the real problem the Russians will face is not right now, its in the coming weeks and months.
Ukrainians clearly aim to keep attriting Russians forces, and might not take many risks for a while as they continue to sap Russian fighting power.
Was struck by two reports. First, Ukrainian military intelligence believes Russia is doing a surreptitious mobilization, which is resulting in troops being sent into Ukraine quietly, but also without the right training and motivation. This idea of the Russians trying to make up losses by sending in hastily composed formations received some support in the Pentagon briefing on Friday where it was claimed in the last week, the Russians actually increased the number of BTGs in Ukr to 105.
Sounds like the Ukrainians are expecting more of this, and plan to try and methodically destroy the new formations.
The most interesting interview Ive seen this week is this one by the head of Ukrainian DoD intelligence. Basically indicating that the Ukrainians believe the full Russian collapse will happen by later summer (August). Makes sense. Ukrainians expect the Russians to continue to drip feed in units, will try and destroy those as they appear and then when the Russians lose the ability to generate these new scratch formations, the Russian army could collapse. | |
https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1525284566038192136
| This thread will be my Ukraine War overview.
Russia is losing 2/3 of a battalion combat group of equipment a day and we are into day 79.
That's over 52.6 full battalion equipment sets out of the 120 initially sent into Ukraine & ~180 over all in the Russian Ground Forces.
In other words, 43% of the total committed Russian mechanized combat vehicle fleet and likely the best 29% of the total Russian combat vehicle fleet have been destroyed or captured. | |
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Sieht so aus, als würden die Zahlen hinkommen.
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| Zitat von Wickeda
Wir sollten dringend noch ein paar Schauspieler fragen, was sie von diesen Waffen so halten!
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Und Nena.
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Ende des Jahres: bittebitte lasst uns die Krim ;_;
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| Zitat von Bombur
| Zitat von Wickeda
Wir sollten dringend noch ein paar Schauspieler fragen, was sie von diesen Waffen so halten!
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Und Nena.
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Der ein oder andere Passant auf der Straße möchte da sicher auch noch was zu sagen!
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Hat man denn Energydrinkveganer und Cibermobbingopfer GröVaz Hildmann schon befragt?
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Der wartet noch die endgültige Meinung des Reis ab!
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Versetzt euch gedanklich nochmal in die Zeit vor der Invasion. Was hättet ihr gedacht wenn euch jemand gesagt hatte dass Russland innerhalb 10 Wochen 30% seines Equipments verliert. Was wir da erleben ist komplett unvorstellbar gewesen.
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Ich warte jetzt auf den Nehm, dass es gar keine schweren Waffen mehr braucht, klappt ja auch so.
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| Zitat von -=Q=- 8-BaLL
Ich warte jetzt auf den Nehm, dass es gar keine schweren Waffen mehr braucht, klappt ja auch so.
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Von mir? Das Gegenteil ist der Fall.
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Ne, von Briefeschreibern.
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| Zitat von -=Q=- 8-BaLL
Ich warte jetzt auf den Nehm, dass es gar keine schweren Waffen mehr braucht, klappt ja auch so.
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Den Sack zu machen wäre ja auch zu einfach!
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Den Sack zu geben ist noch einfacher.
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| Zitat von Black1900
| Zitat von -=Q=- 8-BaLL
Ich warte jetzt auf den Nehm, dass es gar keine schweren Waffen mehr braucht, klappt ja auch so.
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Den Sack zu machen wäre ja auch zu einfach!
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Es kamen ja schon die heißen Takes, dass die Ukraine jetzt sicher nach Moskau marschiert und deswegen soll man denen nichts mehr schicken.
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https://twitter.com/nolanwpeterson/status/1525843448233807878
https://twitter.com/TrentTelenko/status/1525899257252814858
| One thing that stood out for me when I interviewed a Ukrainian MiG-29 pilot was how the Ukrainian Air Force was smartly choosing the time and place of its engagements to stay in the fight and inflict maximum damage.
This mindset is prevalent among ground forces, too. A Ukrainian army lieutenant told me: “We manage to take the initiative and destroy the enemy as it is convenient and safe for us.”
On his portion of the front line, he said the Ukrainians have “dozens” of units, “which are absolutely autonomous in the search, selection and destruction of targets. This keeps the opponent on his toes and demoralizes him.” | |
> Here is interview with leader of one of these independent units. He is from Czechia, so it's in czech language, but lot of interesting info how these groups operate.
Google-Übersetzung des Interviews mit einem tschechischen Kommandanten einer kleinen Gruppe in der Ukraine:
| How did you become the commander of that group?
I actually got to that unit by being a part of it based on my specialization, or rather they chose me based on my experience and ability to control weapons. And language skills, because they had no one who would be able to automatically speak Russian and English. When we left for Sum, there was another commander. Unfortunately, he began to panic. It was clear that he was unable to lead the unit, that he was simply afraid. There is nothing wrong with that, a lot of people are afraid there. But for tasks on the enemy line, one must have a very calm head to be able to handle it. ...
We had to come at night and pick up our people because the commander had such a panic attack that he lost all his people. Eventually I found them, they were just in the woods. They smoked and waited. And in the meantime he was running around the forest like crazy. So we stopped him. Well, since then, the unit has actually chosen me as its commander.
How many people can't take it like that?
The statistics are really fifty to fifty. The fifty percent will come and think they will fight somewhere, it will be romance. It's not. As soon as the grenades start banging next to you, it's something else entirely. And you have to deal with it. Some of those people leave because they can't do it physically. ...
How many people do you command?
There are ten or more people. The size of the unit is determined by how many people come and go, so far it is stable. They are specialists from different parts of the world, from pyrotechnics to infantry that control all American weapons, that is, Javelin, everyone else has learned from them. I have snipers there, I have Ukrainians who live outside Ukraine and they are former soldiers.
So different nationalities?
American, British, Ukrainian, of course one Czech, Colombian, we had a person there from Puerto Rico… It is not always one person of nationality, there are usually several. | | | What does your usual day on the [front]line look like?
Our target is planes and helicopters, and we have the equipment. I have several posts in different locations where I have people I rotate. We get up relatively early, or rather it doesn't matter what day I go to bed and when I get up. But if I take it from the morning: We have some base, which is say five or six kilometers from the line, and then we have a second base on the line, it can be from a kilometer to two hundred meters from the first line, from the enemy. It depends on where I have which group. Either I change them or we stay there, sometimes it happens that we stay in one place for a week and don't leave at all.
And when an event comes?
Our next target is intelligence. That is, we look at where the enemy has moved. We're talking to the brigade headquarters they saw on the drones last night if they had a plan and wanted support from us. If they don't want support, I have places I want to look in advance. The brigade has a comprehensive plan for two or three days, either offensives or defensives. It's mostly an offensive. Maybe we want to take that village back. Our task is to bring information about how many people there are, what technology there is, how that technology moves, where it passes.
Does that mean you're watching them with binoculars, thermal imaging or a drone?
Thermal imaging, drone, binoculars, or we're going to see it. There are an awful lot of minefields, I still have pyrotechnics with me. I'm usually the first to go with him. I don't like sending people when I can't climb there alone. They are soldiers… Some are marines, they are lunatics, they would get where they don't have. Maybe it's the business management experience, I like to calculate that everything fits exactly, I go to check it myself before I let the people there and I give them clear instructions on what to do. I plan to cover both the artillery and my boys with Javeliny. We go there, we observe, if we can get further, then we go even further. We may be sitting there all day. If we see technology that is close and dangerous, we try to eliminate it. All this is reported to the staff.
How accurate are reports of damage done to the enemy?
Everything must be accurately documented either by photography or video, or there is a drone flying to confirm if this is true. There is no saying we destroyed ten tanks, and there is one. The Ukrainian army is collecting it conscientiously. I always have to prove it to the staff, I actually have Ukrainian military coordinates, which I always have to report. The control of that data is very large and is quite detailed. The details then overlap with several people. This means that if I do something and give the coordinates, then I know that a drone will fly there and give the coordinates again.
...
How do you eliminate bigger goals?
We have Javelins, for example. We have the German-Israeli-Singapore RWG90, an armored fist that is able to penetrate both the armor and the building. And then there we have German armored fists that have night vision. We have our, FG-90, those little pipes. These are great. Stingers, of course, we use them to destroy planes and helicopters. We use standard RPG-7, Norwegian production, we have boxes there. We use NLAWs on tanks, or they can be used on a building. They're a little heavier, but they also shoot fantastically. Well, that's basically a selection of the medium-heavy arsenal we have there.
...
What drones do you use?
We use both the small ones, I actually use them directly, all the bigger ones. I only use the little ones when I have guys behind me watching where we go. They tell us what is a hundred meters ahead of us. Then there are the bigger ones who do bigger surveys themselves. And then there are the military drones that our staff has. And they make us a bigger backdrop when we have a bigger plan. Once a Russian drone arrived and started circling our little one terribly aggressively, so I knew something was going to happen. Fortunately, we removed the drone.
How did you shoot [it]?
Normally our Bren. But shooting down a drone is not easy. I have a holographic gauge on Bren. And it works great with that, so acquiring a [target] is easier. On the other hand, he made a mistake, I was under a tree and he tried to target me. He had to go very low and as he got below the level of the tree, I hit him. But hitting a drone is very difficult, this was a coincidence. On the other hand, they are fragile, so if you hit him, he will fly.
...
What is your life like in the trenches?
Donbas is on black earth. Chernozem is such a very potent country, where there is an excellent harvest and which is also very loose. When it rains, it is very sticky. There is no such thing in our country. You basically take two steps and you have ten kilos of clay on your shoes and it's hard to walk, you have legs like Mickey Mouse.
The trenches are still crumbling, clay is suddenly pouring on you from the wall, it is not stable. If you go after the rain, the tanks will not pass, which means that the Russians will not get to us across the fields, they will fit in there, not even the tank will pass. It's physically difficult to mess with. | | | How would you describe the Russian soldiers you come in contact with?
It's complicated with the Russians. Sometimes it seems to me that they are either either not thinking or not experienced. We tried new javelin rockets, for example. The Russians were building a bunker and trenches in front of it. We first sent a couple of shots with a sniper rifle and thought they were hiding because we wanted to target the bunker, look at it properly without them. But they climbed back in five minutes and continued working. Then a smaller rocket arrived, which we tested to see how deep the bunker was. And they were there again in five minutes, hanging around, digging. Eventually we sent Javelin there and no one showed up for two days. An ambulance arrived at night, probably trying to get into the bunker. Some of their behavior is incomprehensible.
The second such experience was that they had a lot of technology behind a building and warmed it up every morning. We weren't able to target [it] with our artillery, so we eventually stepped closer to let Javelin up there, as if attacking a bunker. And the Russians smoked in the middle of the street, where they knew we were on the other side. They went back and forth. When enough of them were grouped, we threw one Javelin there and destroyed it all around. And still other people came out of the other barracks after a while.
Does their tactics improve during the war?
They exchanged two weeks ago, we have new ones there who are a little more vigilant. But they also make absolutely unnecessary mistakes. The question is whether it is training. For example, they transfer a car with ammunition in the middle of the day on the street, even though they know that our drone sees them. Or they build tanks in towns or villages in the middle of the streets. It's incomprehensible, basic tactical mistakes.
So what about the losses? How big are your losses, what are they like?
Losses are difficult to describe. Our losses have been minimal in the last few weeks. The front line is fired daily and the artillery really works in big volleys, both ours and theirs. Unfortunately, we had one death in our company, about two weeks ago. And a few wounded. As far as I know from the brigade, their losses must be dozens of people. The disparity there is huge, I mainly attribute it to the fact that, for example, he will allow himself to climb the barracks in the middle of the day and correct the artillery right in front of us. Of course we cannot allow that. Or they just walk between houses. Because of that, the losses are harder.
Is it also a problem during the day?
Of course, because we see where they are going. He goes to the other person, we find out that he always goes to one place. Then you focus on the place. You're doing some more intelligence. Either we go there or we release a drone and suddenly find out that they have a command center there. For that area or the city. Then we know where they come from, when cars arrive, if there is a larger commander. And if there's anything worth us to destroy. And if you have fifteen or twenty people there every morning for breakfast and you know it's headquarters, then of course you go.
Is there a big difference between the accuracy of your support and the Russian one?
Huge. When I compare Russian and our Ukrainian artillery, the accuracy is incomparable. Ukrainians are really accurate. Artillery should normally have a soldier closest to 400 or 500 meters, armor about 300 meters and a tank up to 200 meters. I called myself artillery and I had artillery some 200 or 250 meters. They were able to hit it, it corrected plus or minus a few meters. They can really be trusted.
It falls around the Russians, they don't go. We have so many holes in the field around us… These are not Grady that have unguided missiles, this is normal artillery. And we still have a field where no one is. Holes in a field where no one is growing like mushrooms after rain. We tell our artillery that there is a tank in the village, and they are able to hit it.
What about the support of the locals? There is almost a belief in the Czech Republic that even originally pro-Russian separatists are now supporting Ukraine.
I would divide that into two parts. Donbas is specific, but I'll start by saying that I've been in parts other than Donbas. There, the support was almost 100%. For example, we were hidden in the woods and had some homework. So the grandmother brought us food with her granddaughter every day or every other day. She cooked for us, fantastic Ukrainian food. It was like a hotel. Stewed fruit and all sorts of chops, just about everything, it was fantastic.
It's more complicated on Donbas. Because the villages where we are, where we operate, are already empty. But the people who stayed there are largely for Russia. Ninety percent of the village is empty, the people have left, but the rest that are there simply support Russia, though not everyone. We know who doesn't, but sometimes you can't say that.
What has stuck with you the most from Ukraine?
I would like to describe the determination of the Ukrainian people and the people who are fighting there. That's something Putin didn't want to deal with. He turned a bunch of different people in Ukraine into one nation.
How does it manifest itself?
I see it, for example, in the posts we go through. People appreciate [us] being there. That's one thing. Some could not understand why I was from the Czech Republic there fighting. And I have a bunch of other people with me who don't speak Ukrainian or Russian. And the inner struggles between the people may have subsided a little. Cohesion is there. | |
https://twitter.com/maria_avdv/status/1525935012222316545
| Beyond words. Today Ukrainian military 227th battalion of the 127th territorial defense brigade reached the border with Russia in the Kharkiv region. Glory to Ukraine! | |
https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1524839846870667271
| If there's one thing that's become a signature of the war in Ukraine, it's the flying tank turret - a problem for both sides, as their Soviet-era tanks have the same flawed designs. But has the wrong suspect been fingered as the murderer? A CSI: UA thread.
...
So is the carousel the cause of those spectacular explosions? There's reason to think it might not be the direct culprit.
First, the carousel is actually quite well protected. It's recessed deep within the hull, as this image shows. When in use, its top is covered by a heavy steel plate, which should protect against fragments entering via the turret.
...
The most likely conclusion from this is that the spectacular explosions we've seen are not initiated by the carousel, but by the ammunition and propellant stored in recesses in the turret and crew compartment. When they go up, they likely cause the carousel to explode too.
The Russians and Ukrainians could in theory mitigate this risk by removing the explosive material in the turret. However, they would likely be reluctant to do so, as it would remove a large portion of the tank's ammo and propellant charges, reducing its effectiveness.
So for the foreseeable future, expect to see many more turrets flying off tanks on the battlefields of Ukraine. | |
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[Dieser Beitrag wurde 3 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Herr der Lage am 15.05.2022 23:54]
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Das Bild fehlt in der Uusammenfassung von HdL und fasst es am besten zusammen.
Die meisten Treffer treffen den Turm, im Turm wird auch Munition und Treibstoff für die Kanone gelagert. Höchstwahrscheinlich fliegt eher das in die Luft, als das das Karussell unten.
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Treibladung ist das Wort was Du gesucht hast. Nicht das der Direktor noch zum Karussell wird...
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Ja stimmt ist schon spät.
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Was ist eigentlich aus der Krim-Brücke geworden... es gab doch eine Webseite mit Timer und so?
Die Brücke steht noch.
Die Webseite sagt jetzt:
| We are not Nazis, not murderers, not looters. Unlike Putin and his army. We are Ukrainians. And Crimea is our homeland with you, it is Ukraine. We already have modern weapons capable of striking hundreds of kilometers.
But we do not want meaningless deaths, blood and destruction. We will soon return everything taken by the vile and insidious enemy. Crimea will become a modern European resort. Coming soon! It's time! Everything will be UKRAINE! | |
Und es ist auch verdammt schwer, eine Brücke im Feindesland zu zerstören, wenn der Feind etwas dagegen hat.
Um im Vietnam-Krieg die Thanh Hóa Bridge zu zerstören, brauchten die USA 7 Jahre, 873 Lufteinsätze, unzählige Bomben und verloren dabei (mindestens) 11 Flugzeuge.
| The North Vietnamese made various claims as to how many planes they shot down, but the US only recognizes the loss of eleven aircraft during attacks against the bridge. However, the concentration of air defense assets also took its toll on passing aircraft and in total an estimated 104 American pilots were shot down over a 75-square-mile (190 km2) area around the bridge during the war.
873 air sorties were expended against the bridge and it was hit by hundreds of bombs and missiles before finally being destroyed. It became something of a symbol of resistance for the North Vietnamese, and various legends of invincibility were attached to it. For the US planners it became an obsession, and many raids were planned against it despite their unpopularity with the pilots. | |
Wenn die Brücke dagegen stehenbleibt,
- bindet sie feindliche Luftabwehrkräfte,
- man kann gut beobachten, was für Material über die Brücke heran rollt, und
- falls die Ukraine den Süden/die Krim zurückerobern will, lässt man dem Feind eine Fluchtmöglichkeit.
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Was die Tageszeitung so für Leserbriefe erhält (und veröffentlicht).
Juuuunge.
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Die estnische Premierministerin erklärt russische Verhandlungstaktik.
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Der erste Brief ist natürlich allerfeinstes Whataboutism, aber zum Glück kommt dann als Ausgleich der zweite Brief.
Im Allgemeinen nichts ungewöhnliches, stattdessen ganz normales Niveau für Leserbriefe in Lokal-/Tageszeitungen. Ich weiß schon, warum ich Leserbriefe in gedruckten Zeitungen gekonnt ignoriere. Ist besser für den Blutdruck. Jetzt muss ich das nur noch für Online-Kommentarspalten umsetzen...
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Der Typ zumindest ist seriös.
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| Zitat von [NRG]Sonic
Der erste Brief ist natürlich allerfeinstes Whataboutism, aber zum Glück kommt dann als Ausgleich der zweite Brief.
Im Allgemeinen nichts ungewöhnliches, stattdessen ganz normales Niveau für Leserbriefe in Lokal-/Tageszeitungen. Ich weiß schon, warum ich Leserbriefe in gedruckten Zeitungen gekonnt ignoriere. Ist besser für den Blutdruck. Jetzt muss ich das nur noch für Online-Kommentarspalten umsetzen...
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Leserbriefe sind doch nur das analoge Pendant zu Aidskrebs Twitter oder YT Kommentaren.
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| Zitat von Schm3rz
| Zitat von [NRG]Sonic
Der erste Brief ist natürlich allerfeinstes Whataboutism, aber zum Glück kommt dann als Ausgleich der zweite Brief.
Im Allgemeinen nichts ungewöhnliches, stattdessen ganz normales Niveau für Leserbriefe in Lokal-/Tageszeitungen. Ich weiß schon, warum ich Leserbriefe in gedruckten Zeitungen gekonnt ignoriere. Ist besser für den Blutdruck. Jetzt muss ich das nur noch für Online-Kommentarspalten umsetzen...
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Leserbriefe sind doch nur das analoge Pendant zu Aidskrebs Twitter oder YT Kommentaren.
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True, aber immerhin hat man bei den gedruckten Briefen ne Redaktion die die auswählt, und auch immer nur ein bis zwei
Weiterer Funfakt, die drucken mitlerweile nicht selten direkt die Kommentare aus den Kommentarspalten, da steht dann "onlinekommentar" oder sowas...
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| Zitat von Shooter
Weiterer Funfakt, die drucken mitlerweile nicht selten direkt die Kommentare aus den Kommentarspalten, da steht dann "onlinekommentar" oder sowas...
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Internetausdrucker.
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Auf totem Holz hat es gleich mehr Wertigkeit.
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Badabapbapaa
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Thema: Allgemeine Diskussion zum Ukraine Krieg |
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