|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Was für eine Reichweite müsste so eine Drohne dann haben? 600 km?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Vielleicht ja Kollaborateure die aus einer viel näheren Entfernung eine Drohne gestartet haben.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von Troodon
Vielleicht ja Kollaborateure die aus einer viel näheren Entfernung eine Drohne gestartet haben.
| |
Offizielle Stellen der Ukraine sagen wohl auch, dass sie es nicht waren.
Kann aber auch nur Verwirrung und Angst-machen sein: "Wir waren das nicht, eure besetzten Gebiete sind voll mit Partisanen."
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Wieso sollten kollaborateure das tun?
Partisanen?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von Troodon
Vielleicht ja Kollaborateure die aus einer viel näheren Entfernung eine Drohne gestartet haben.
| |
Meinst du Partisanen?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von Aspe
| | Zitat von Troodon
Vielleicht ja Kollaborateure die aus einer viel näheren Entfernung eine Drohne gestartet haben.
| |
Meinst du Partisanen?
| |
Er meint kollaborateure der ukrainischen Nazi-Regierung
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von Jellybaby
Doch, das ist vernünftig. Man weiß ja erst mal nur, dass der Hafen nicht so unangreifbar ist wie gedacht.
| |
Was Friedel sagt, und dieser Auffassung scheinen auch bei Twitter viele zu folgen, ist, dass Russland ein Grund zur Absage der Parade sehr gelegen kommen dürfte.
So eine Aktion bindet viel Personal und Material, welches dazu noch an bekannten Orten zentral gebündelt wird.
Für die Ukraine wäre ein Strike während der Parade, im Stile von Moskwa 2.0, deutlich wirkmächtiger als etwas verteilter Grünschnitt im Innenhof.
Die Gelegenheit bekommen sie aber genau deswegen nun nicht.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von [gc]Fidel
Was für eine Reichweite müsste so eine Drohne dann haben? 600 km?
| |
ungefähr die gleiche wie über den Landweg, wenn man sich die Landkarte so ansieht.
Kommt auch drauf an wo sie gestartet wäre. Von z.B. Odessa aus wäre über See sogar der kürzere Weg.
/wahrscheinlich ist das zu weit, aber für " mehrere hundert Kilometer über russisch besetztes Territorium, welches voller luftabwehr ist, geflogen" gilt das genauso.
| | Zitat von d.n.M. *TtC*
Für die Ukraine wäre ein Strike während der Parade, im Stile von Moskwa 2.0, deutlich wirkmächtiger als etwas verteilter Grünschnitt im Innenhof. | |
nein, da wären ggf. auch viele zivile Zuschauer, das wäre ein totales Desaster. Zumindest wäre das Risiko viel zu groß.
Um den Russen die Miniversion eines Doolittle raid Moments zu verpassen ist es völlig unerheblich ob die komplette Führung der Marine ausradiert wird oder nur ein paar Meter vom Vorgarten umgepflügt sind.
Im Grunde ist sogar egal wer das am Ende wirklich war. Um eine Reaktion zu erzwingen reicht es völlig aus, dass der Stützpunkt auf einmal überhaupt angreifbar ist.
Und für die Moral reicht das Datum, das trollen haben die Ukrainer offensichtlich nicht verlernt.
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 2 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Jellybaby am 31.07.2022 12:09]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Zum Glück wurde nur eine Veranstaltung abgesagt.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | Zitat von Jellybaby
| | Zitat von [gc]Fidel
Was für eine Reichweite müsste so eine Drohne dann haben? 600 km?
| |
ungefähr die gleiche wie über den Landweg, wenn man sich die Landkarte so ansieht.
Kommt auch drauf an wo sie gestartet wäre. Von z.B. Odessa aus wäre über See sogar der kürzere Weg.
/wahrscheinlich ist das zu weit, aber für " mehrere hundert Kilometer über russisch besetztes Territorium, welches voller luftabwehr ist, geflogen" gilt das genauso.
| |
Eben. Das ist ja der Punkt, den ich machen will. Dass das eben sehr unwahrscheinlich ist.
Welche Drohnen hat denn die Ukraine, die diese Distanz schaffen?
Und angenommen es sind Einwegdrohnen, dann sollten es 300 km sein.
Ich kenne nur die Bayraktar, die kommt da nicht hin, würde wohl auch kaum geopfert werden.
Eine switchblade 300 schafft ca. 10 km, die 600er schafft 40 km.
Mehr kenne ich nicht. Sicher gibt's da was. Aber ich kenne es nicht.
Also was hat die Ukraine, was diese Schäden anrichtet (siehe Bilder und Meldungen), was man opfern kann und diese Strecke schafft und an der russischen Flugabwehr um sewastopol, immerhin sitz der schwarzmeerflotte, vorbei kommt?
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 3 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von [gc]Fidel am 31.07.2022 13:57]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ist das eine Rolle Klopapier da an der rechten Seite der Scheibe? 
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Küchenrolle zum Kondenswasser abwischen vielleicht
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Könnte sowas sein
Poo-tin extra flauschig
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | One of Ukraine's richest businessmen has been killed with his wife in "massive" Russian shelling of the southern city of Mykolaiv.
Oleksiy Vadatursky, 74, and his wife Raisa died when a missile hit their home overnight, local officials said. | |
| | | Meanwhile, an adviser to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's office, said he believed Russia had deliberately targeted the businessman. | |
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62367356
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Ich finde diesen besonders interessant, Perun hat irgendwie so den richtigen Knacks dafür um brutal komplizierte Themen so weit runterzunudeln dass jemand wie ich auch nützliche Dinge versteht.
Den Scope von "Make or buy" erstmal nur auf die USA zu limitieren war genau der richtige Move.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Irgendwas passiert möglicherweise gerade zwischen Kosovo und Serbien
| | Kosovo army plans to launch "operation" against Serbs at midnight - Vučić
“I think that we have never been in a more difficult and difficult situation than today. Why did I say this? The Pristina regime is trying, presenting itself as a victim, | |
https://twitter.com/Lyla_lilas/status/1553798530996879360
| | A high ranking Serbian official from Vucic's SNS and MP says Serbia will have to "embark on a denazifying mission in the Balkans."
Along with Vucic's unconvincing pleas for "peace" in Kosovo, my gut feeling is they are up to something. | |
https://twitter.com/HarunKarcic/status/1553762743735537665
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
was soll das denn auf einmal. 
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | There isn’t a conflict or escalation brewing in Kosovo atm. Kosovo Serbs set up roadblocks towards two main border crossings with Serbia in the north, in opposition to a move by the 🇽🇰 gov’t whereby Serbian citizens need special certificates when entering the country. #calmdown
Since Serbia doesn’t recognize Kosovo, 🇽🇰 citizens need special “temporary documents” while residing in the country. PM Albin Kurti recently announced that Kosovo would reciprocate by demanding the same from Serbian citizens. The decision enters into force tonight.
Politically motivated (or influenced) Kosovo Serbs gathered on the roads towards the border in order to stop people from driving to Serbia. Similar roadblocks have been set up several times over the years, and while they do signal tensions, they rarely lead to armed escalations.
This is because the north of Kosovo is covered by more NATO/KFOR troops per capita than almost any place in Europe. They are stationed there to maintain order, and escalations like these are exactly when their powers come into force. | |
https://twitter.com/UnaHajdari/status/1553808798896340993
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bitte jetzt keinen Holy my slivovic moment. War schon die letzten Male scheiße, Jungs. 
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1553804514490286080
| | I am not even checking what is happening between Serbia and Kosovo.
Because there are 2 foreign military commands in Kosovo: an American and an Italian, which have an US Air Force F-16C Block 40 wing at Aviano and an Italian Air Force Eurofighter wing at Gioia del Colle and an F-35A wing at Amendola, plus an Italian Army paratroopers brigade at Pisa & a US Army airborne brigade at Aviano as backup.
If the Serbians do something stupid it will take 2 hours for the first of 100+ fighter-bombers to appear above the Serbian troops... & kill them all.
| |
https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1553653161273040896 | Thread Reader
| | Sunday update in Ukraine, what seems to be happening when little is changing on the map.
On the surface this week, like the last 4, has been one of an almost static warfare. Almost no change on the map in the Donbas or Kherson fronts (a village here or there, thats it). ...
This lack of movement has been at a large cost to the Russians (Pentagon says 'gigantic'--see below where I mention how Pentagon views campaign) and Russia shows little sign of generating the kind of sustained combat power to resume sustained atttack.
The main change in the Donbas since early July is the continuing failure of the Russians to generate the kinds of strong artillery fire which allowed their incremental advances before then. Ranged fire in the Donbas stayed very low this week.
Here is a 6-day map from yesterday backwards and one from July 9. The collapse of recorded fires in the area is massive. Seems like the destruction of Russian depots starting around June 30 is a problem the Russians have been unable to solve.
Map didnt change much in the Kherson region this week, but something did finally occur. There was a noticeable decrease in fire activity, which means the destruction of Russian depots there (which started about 10 days after Donbas) is having the same effect.
Major decrease started on July 25, and has continued compared to earlier ... This is not surprising, but shows that the methodical Ukrainian logistics campaign against depots, bridges and command/control is paying dividends. Russian firepower advantage is waning.
Now the big question--the Ukrainian counterattack.
Signs are that the Ukrainians are not rushing into this, and the general difficulty of maneuvering large number of tanks and APCs on the modern battlefield against defensive weapons means it still might be a while til they do.
The Ukrainians seem to be carving the Kherson front into separate districts for the Russians, which will have huge difficulties supporting each other. This is why they have been cutting the bridges over the Dnipr river, but also the rivers dividing the areas on the west bank.
Having made these areas non-supporting, and also reduced Russian ranged fires, they are now probing it for weaknesses without taking massive risks. Its not glamorous, but its smart. They seem to be sending small units to find weak points.
So while the Ukrainians seem to be advancing in Kherson about as slowly as the Russians advanced in the Donbas, they are doing is far more intelligently.
1) they are not risking suffering major losses.
2) They are doing it not just by blasting the land in front of them that they want to take (making their plans obvious) but by severely hampering Russian abilities to fight back through the logistics and command/control attacks.
My guess is that this will continue for a while. Ukrainians have learned in this war (unlike the Russians so far) to do things the smart way. They seem ready to spend more time (weeks) methodically cutting off and destroying Russian forces in the Kherson area. Its the smart thing. Might not be much of map change next week either.
Before going, wanted to highlight this tweet from @GeneralStaffUA yesterday, because its so extraordinary that sometimes we forget just how extraordinary it is. The Ukrainians are taunting the much vaunted Russian air force about their inability to fly over Ukraine.
The reason the Ukrainians can attempt this counterattack in the Kherson, and move their new ranged systems around safely on open major roads not far from the battlefield is because the Russian Air Force is afraid to fly over Ukraine, it just lbs distance weapons from Russia. ...
Overall another sign of why the Ukrainians arent taking any risks in Kherson. The trends of the war are Russia using weaker, older systems and struggling to generate new forces, Ukraine getting better systems. Just means that a dramatic change in the war might take a while longer.
| |
https://twitter.com/PhillipsPOBrien/status/1553274499403059200 | Thread Reader
| | The Ukrainians fighting in a way that the Pentagon wants to 'study', the most important point in an briefing from a Pentagon official yesterday. The difference between the two sides in terms of smarts and strategy is growing. Here is the whole transcript.
In this evaluation of the situation in the Donbas, all of which is interesting, the end of the first paragraph stands out from an analytic perspective. They are so impressed by the Ukrainian staged withdrawal from Severodonetsk, that is deserves 'study'.
Indeed the overall evaluation in the region is that the Ukrainians know what they are doing, the point about 'finding and killing' Russian command and control is high praise coming from the Pentagon, as that is a key element of US strategy.
Also very damning of Russian behavior. They are paying a 'gigantic' cost for a few miles of ground. This is ultimately because the growing gap between the armies is not just the new Ukrainian ranged systems, Russian soldiers are increasingly poorly trained and motivated.
| |
Chief of MI6 / Ministry of Defense:
https://twitter.com/ChiefMI6/status/1553309715299536896
https://twitter.com/DefenceHQ/status/1553040194680623104
| | The Kremlin is growing desperate.
Russia has lost tens of thousands of soldiers and is using Soviet-era weapons.
Their outdated missiles are killing and injuring innocent Ukrainians.
Russia won't win this unjust war.
The UK continues to #StandWithUkraine | |
https://twitter.com/Jack_Watling/status/1553745899871952897 | Thread Reader
| | Seen a few takes recently arguing that Russian weapons don’t work well.
Having spent time inside a number of Russian manufactured systems I thought I’d address why I think there is often a gap between Russian weapons on paper versus their performance in the field. 1/25
There are two primary problems with Russian weapons: integration and cognitive load.
... [Thread] ...
So, on the one hand quality control in Soviet manufacturing was poor. On the other hand the design team just accepted this and built in redundency to produce a very reliable and effective attack helicopter. Russian weapons involve lots of these kinds of workarounds.
This becomes a problem when you want to integrate new things onto the platform.
When the Mi-24 was built it was intended for gun runs using rockets and machine guns. As MANPADS proliferated however the Russians recognised stand-off ATGMs were needed.
The Russians have built several very effective ATGMs some of which can be mounted from the Mi-35. They have impressive range and penetration. They are accurate weapons. However, the Mi-35 is built with the assumption that lots of its components will break while in use. This firstly means that there is a lot of vibration in the platform and secondly means that this vibration is not consistent between platforms or between flights, as various sub-components fail. The result is that the mounted optics on this aircraft are very hard to use.
The last time I was in an Mi-35 we gave up searching for targets with the sensors in the nose and just used a big pair of field glasses out of the cockpit. The result was that while we had plenty of range with our ATGMs we couldn't actually accurately engage at that range. ...
So this is the first reason for a delta between capability and performance. Individually Russian weapons and platforms tend to do what they are designed for and do it reliably. When you start integrating things together however there are often problems deep in the design.
Now for cognitive load.
The Soviet military was a conscript military and the Russian military today has a similar structure. When you buy a Russian weapon system you usually get a nice cardboard flow chart showing you the buttons to press in what sequence to get a result.
If you get in a Buk [missile system] for example there are a lot of buttons and each one tends to do one thing. Furthermore, each operator does one task. It is actually quite easy to teach someone to use it to a basic standard because using the controls doesn't understanding the system.
However, to use the system to a high standard is really difficult because YOU are the integrator. The computer isn't doing much for you. If something is out of the ordinary you need to find the workaround and get the crew to do all the right things in the right order.
NATO systems tend to have far fewer controls and what the controls do is contextual. The system supports the user so they can focus on judgement. The result is a system with a much higher initial training burden but a much higher effectiveness for a newly trained crew.
If you have expert crews then Russian weapons systems are highly effective and can be more effective in some cases than NATO counterparts. If you watch old Finnish or Ukrainian Buk operators who have been at it a while it is impressive.
But if you have short term contract soldiers - and especially if you lost a lot of your more skilled personnel early - then the Russians are left with crews whose basic proficiency isn't sufficient. You end up with less and less skilled people using the equipment.
...
There are lots of other issues with the Russian targeting process. Often they are 48 hours late striking a target because of how inefficient their kill chains are. In Chernobyl it was noted that their soldiers were using maps from before the disaster... Well, some of the things they've struck that appear completely random or blatant misses make more sense when you look at the older maps. So in some cases their kill chain is 40 years out of date.
| |
Ein paar Tweets zu der neulich schon erwähnten Yale-Studie:
https://twitter.com/LukasSustala/status/1553462525269884929
| | | „Es ist ein Lügenmärchen, dass die Sanktionen Europa härter treffen als Russland.“ Starker #Leitartikel in der morgigen @DiePressecom von Ultsch. Putin treibt Russland in den Ruin. | |
https://twitter.com/HptmMatei/status/1552644883986399235 | Thread Reader
| | [Yale-Studie:] Demnach "wirken Sanktionen verheerend auf Russlands Wirtschaft“
🧵In diesem Thread skizziere ich euch einige konkrete Ergebnisse der Studie - natürlich mit Bildern
Annahmen Studie:
👉 Kreml verheimlicht ungünstige Wirtschaftsdaten
👉 veröffentlicht solche, die eigene Linie stützen
Studiengrundlage = nicht von RUS veröffentlichte Daten, wie:
👉Schiffsverkehr
👉individueller Konsum
👉Einschätzungen RUS Handelspartnern
👉Wirtschaftsprüfern
RUS wichtige Rolle als Rohstoffexporteur „unwiederbringlich dahin“ weil:
👉 Westen als Hauptmarkt (Grafik) geht zurück
👉 Export Infrastruktur nur zum Westen
👉 gehypter Osten nicht an Kern Infrastruktur angebunden (Grafik)
👉 CHI kauft mehr Öl, aber schlechter Preis (Grafik)
RUS Importe „weitgehend eingebrochen“ - trotz Schlupflöcher
👉 große Versorgungsengpässe in heimischer Wirtschaft (Grafik)
👉 Kompletter Produktionsstillstand
👉 auch aus China Import Einbruch (Grafik)
BIP sei wirklich um 40% eingebrochen
👉aufgrund Abzug über 1000 Unternehmen (Grafik)
👉dauerhafter Brain Drain
👉Inflation von 20%
RUS Finanzmarkt als „worst performing markets in the entire world this year“
👉 abgeschnitten vom internationalen Finanzmarkt
👉 Investoren langfristig vergrault
👉 künstliches „aufblasen“ der eigenen Märkte
👉 Ausländische Währungsreserven bluten aus (Grafik)
| |
https://twitter.com/veigokell/status/1553212461653938177 | Thread Reader
| | Yale University analysis: sanctions are catastrophically crippling the Russian economy.
... [Thread] ...
Conclusion: Putin is resorting to patently unsustainable, dramatic fiscal and monetary intervention to smooth over these structural economic weaknesses and Kremlin finances are in much, much more dire straits than conventionally understood.
Conclusion 2: Russian domestic financial markets, as an indicator of both present conditions and future outlook, are the worst performing markets in the entire world this year despite strict capital controls.
Conclusion 3: Looking ahead, there is no path out of economic oblivion for Russia as long as the allied countries remain unified in maintaining and increasing sanctions pressure against Russia.
Conclusin 4: Defeatist headlines arguing that Russia’s economy has bounced back are simply not factual - the facts are that, by any metric and on any level, the Russian economy is reeling, and now is not the time to step on the brakes.
| |
https://twitter.com/IlyaMatveev_/status/1553692416212930561 | Thread Reader
| | One macro effect of sanctions that is not often discussed: Russian Central Bank projects an astonishing $246 billion net outflow of capital in 2022 - despite capital controls!
... The explanation apparently lies in the fact that exporters accumulate their profits on their foreign accounts and do not re-invest in Russia. This is registered as capital outflows. ...
In essence, the famed record trade surplus is directly translated into record net outflow of capital. Hence no real benefits to the Russian economy.
Takeaways: 1) the ruble probably won't collapse even as oil/gas trade with Europe continues to decline, 2) nevertheless, Russia's economy is in an extremely unhealthy state, with neither trade surplus nor strong ruble indicating that "sanctions aren't working".
| |
https://twitter.com/jakluge/status/1553471806958456832
| | | Although #Russia halved its deliveries through #NordStream1 from 40% to 20% capacity on July 27, gas spot prices hardly changed from early July. #Gazprom is certainly beyond its revenue sweet spot by now. | |
https://twitter.com/Frialum/status/1553506097952079874
| | Well, not surprised that journalists found the link between Gazprombank and the Russian army - Kremlin is simply using it to pay their soldiers. They don't even transfer it to a different bank, so Europe is directly paying for the invasion of Ukraine, not even metaphorically
Filtration camps' guards funded by the EU
Source: radiosvoboda.org/...
| |
https://twitter.com/noclador/status/1553623195978178560
| | How prescient by the russians to have dug the graves for the Olenivka POWs "killed in a surprise Ukrainian missile strike" in advance... ... ... ... so, so, so prescient:
| | > @Maxar image from the Olenivka Prison where 50 PoWs were killed seems shows possible graves dug near the north wall.
The possible graves appear to be open and recently dug on the 27th (2 days prior to the explosion) and covered on the 30th (1 day after).
 | |
| |
https://twitter.com/ArtisanalAPT/status/1553680084862730241
| | Imagery at the north side of #AntonovskiyBridge from 30 July shows a long line of civilian vehicles waiting to cross via pontoon ferry, leaving #Kherson. Trenches have been recently dug in the traffic circles as well. Russian forces are preparing to defend this area.
From imagery at 09:11 and 12:28 UTC on 30 July, there are about 100 vehicle in each image waiting to leave #Kherson. But on the south side of the river, only 4-8 vehicles wait to head toward Kherson. | |
https://twitter.com/RealCynicalFox/status/1553083894349578241
| | On the castration video, short 🧵:
...
Beyond the obvious facts that this is a war crime & its unlikely the perpetrator will ever face any kind of objective justice, there is another issue at play here.
Coupled with filtration camps, where US intelligence asserts executions have taken place, this conflict is taking on a level of barbarity that historically results in both retaliations & refusals to take prisoners. When it happens from the Ukrainian side, & I believe it will as this conflict continues & Russian brutality escalates, we should not be surprised.
Ex: Some units within the US Army routinely refused to take Waffen-SS personnel prisoner. Most famously when elements of 45th ID executed SS guards at Dachau. All charges were later dismissed by General Patton.
Enraged American soldiers executed 50 Nazis at Dachau concentration camp | Daily Mail
The Pacific Theatre was even more infamous for the brutality of the fighting in the island hoping campaign. In no small part b/c of the experience Allied personnel had with the conduct of the Japanese military.
Should such acts continue, Ukrainain retaliation is inevitable. There are limits to what even the best trained, disciplined, & led soldiers will tolerate. When it happens, it will become a media circus. When it happens, we must remember it did not occur w/o provocation.
| |
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Herr der Lage am 31.07.2022 21:03]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Auch wenn es vielleicht etwas spät sei mit der Aufarbeitung von 2014 zu beginnen und diese von den westlichen Medien weitestgehend auch bereits gut abgedeckt war, wer für den damaligen Krieg verantwortlich ist.
Hab ich mir mal zu Herzen genommen ein paar bedeutsame Zitate von Igor Girkin (Strelkow) von damals 2014 und bis 2021 zu übersetzen.
Und ein paar andere, die sich mit seinen Aussagen überschneiden.
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 2 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Troodon am 31.07.2022 22:11]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
weiß jemand wer hinter der Seite steckt? Die Aufstellung ist schön anschaulich. Es wäre schön, wenn die Zahlen stimmen, aber sie sehen ziemlich überzogen aus:
https://minusrus.com/en
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1000 POW auf 40k cargo200? Das allein finde ich schon komisch.
Der Krieg ist zwar derbstes Arty-Slugfest, von daher wird's wohl vergleichsweise wenig POWs geben, aber trotzdem wirkt das seltsam.
|
|
[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von ghostbear am 31.07.2022 23:33]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Falls sich das mit "Turkey" -> "Türkiye" durchsetzt, könnte sich der englische Sprachraum darauf verständigen, dass ab sofort auch der Vogel "Türkiye" genannt wird? Nur für shits and giggles?
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Thema: Allgemeine Diskussion zum Ukraine Krieg |
.png)
