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Die Russen mobilisieren die letzten Unwilligen, und die Ukraine zuballert denen dann alles und lädt es in 4K60FPS auf YT hoch...
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Guter Punkt!
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| | Zitat von Troodon
Die besten Aussagen von Shoigu:
| | In der Anfangsphase bestanden die Streitkräfte der Ukraine aus etwa 200.000 Menschen. Während dieser Zeit haben sie mehr als 100.000 Verluste. Die Hälfte der Armee ist verloren. Daher befindet sich die Ukraine bereits in ihrer vierten Mobilisierungswelle, fast 300.000 wurden eingezogen. Unsere bisherigen Verluste belaufen sich auf 5937 Tote.
Im Rahmen der Teilmobilmachung werden wir 300.000 Reservisten aufbieten. | |
Ich hab in Mathe wohl schlecht aufgepasst. Aber wenn Russland, mit einem Verlust von nur 6k Soldaten, bereits die halbe ukrainische Armee (mehrmals), vernichtet hat.
Dann braucht es 300.000 Mobilisierte wozu?
Ich ahne schon. Später wird er sagen, er habe eine Null vergessen. 
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Siehste mal, welche Qualität die Reservisten heben. Man braucht 300k davon, um nichtmal 6k zu ersetzen.
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Meine Güte, Russland muss dringend was für die Arbeitssicherheit tun
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| | Zitat von Mobius
Meine Güte, Russland muss dringend was für die Arbeitssicherheit tun
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problem solved.
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das sind u.a. die, die zum Tode verurteilt worden waren. Sean Pinner und Aiden Aslin
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| | Zitat von -=Q=- 8-BaLL
Gesture of goodwill?
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Gesture of Saudi bloodmoney
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| | Zitat von Sentinel2150
das sind u.a. die, die zum Tode verurteilt worden waren. Sean Pinner und Aiden Aslin
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Interessant ist der Teil
| | | There are ongoing efforts to secure a prisoner swap of 50 Ukrainians in exchange for 200 Russians, including what reports indicate could be one of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s close allies, Viktor Medvedchuk. Medvedchuk was captured by Ukrainians in April. | |
Verhältnis 1:4 und Medvedchuk. Könnte sein, dass diese Ukrainer dann Azov-Mitglieder aus Asovstal sind.
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Glaubst man dass Asow-Menschen, gerade aus der symbolträchtigen Schlacht, so lange in russischer Gefangenschaft aushalten würden?
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| | Zitat von [Muh!]Shadow
Glaubst man dass Asow-Menschen, gerade aus der symbolträchtigen Schlacht, so lange in russischer Gefangenschaft aushalten würden?
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Die sind ja ziemlich großes Faustpfand. Daher ja. Bis auf die, die man halt umgebracht hat und dann behauptet hat, die Ukrainer hätten das Gefangenlager bombardiert
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Das letzte Aufbäumen dieses kranken Menschen, hoffe ich. Dieses Land ist doch so lost mittlerweile...
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US Ambassador to Ukraine
https://twitter.com/USAmbKyiv/status/1572469750156107777
| | | Sham referenda and mobilization are signs of weakness, of Russian failure. The United States will never recognize Russia's claim to purportedly annexed Ukrainian territory, and we will continue to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes. | |
https://twitter.com/Bundeskanzler/status/1572568819297812480
| | Putins Ankündigung der #Teilmobilisierung ist ein Akt der Verzweiflung. Russland kann diesen verbrecherischen Krieg nicht gewinnen. Putin hat die Situation von Anfang an komplett unterschätzt - den Widerstandswillen der #Ukraine und die Geschlossenheit ihrer Freunde.
Die geplanten Scheinreferenden sind der Versuch, mit Gewalt das Land des Nachbarn zu erobern. Das werden wir nicht akzeptieren. In unserer Welt muss das Recht über die Gewalt siegen. Die Gewalt kann nicht stärker sein als das Recht!
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https://twitter.com/MAStrackZi/status/1572500958982320128
| | Von der von Putin verkündeten Teilmobilmachung sollten wir uns nicht nervös machen lassen. Sie ist schlicht ein Eingeständnis der Erfolge der #Ukraine & Zeichen der russischen Schwäche. Sie muss als Anlass dienen, unsere Bemühungen zur Unterstützung der UKR zu intensivieren.
Zudem dürfen wir nicht vergessen: Für eine gelungene sogenannte Teil-Mobilmachung benötigt es eine sehr intensive und funktionierende Infrastruktur, über die Russland aktuell schlicht gar nicht verfügt. Die westlichen Partner sollten besonnen, aber entschieden reagieren. | |
Threads:
https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1572508504937877506 | Thread Reader
| | There'll be lots of commentary this morning about the logistical difficulties of Putin's announcement of a partial mobilisation. But I thought I'd add a few points, based on my own personal observations, of what it means politically and for the troops already in Ukraine.
First, politics: Putin was clearly under a lot of pressure to react to Russia's defeat east of Kharkiv. This is very likely his way of responding to increasingly strident demands. IMO, this shows that he fears the nationalist flank more than the general public.
Second, morale. As I've previously documented from Russian soldiers' accounts and intercepted phone calls published by Ukraine, many Russian soldiers are badly demoralised and want to go home. 20-40% of the men from some units have reportedly quit.
... [Thread] ...
So in short, I see this move not so much as being about creating a brand new army for Russia but as creating political cover for Putin and enabling him to rest and reorganise his current depleted army over the winter.
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https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1572568398969868288 | Thread Reader
| | The speech from Putin today is a careful balancing act of a leader under pressure, who is trying to:
1. please hardliners and Russian milbloggers;
2. not displease the general populace;
3. appease the military;
4. give the impression he is not losing a war. 🧵
The full text is worth a read. It demonstrates the range of interests that Putin is appealing to. It is also Putin’s version of a war update to the Russian people.
...
On mobilisation - it is interesting that he doesn’t describe it as his order, rather “I find it necessary to support the proposal of the Defence Ministry and the General Staff on partial mobilisation”. This sets up the military for eventual blame in the war.
The partial mobilisation is unlikely to appease hardliners and will probably scare the general population. Perhaps this is why airfares out of Russia are selling so quickly. ...
Putin would have clearly felt pressure from the military to initiate this call up. The majority of the Russian army has been committed to this war. Russian Army leaders have watched their army slowly but surely disappear. They needed to replenish manpower if they were to just hold onto territory already taken. Not only have they lost huge numbers of personnel killed and wounded, there will have been other losses from accidents and psychological issues. And those that remain in Ukraine have been in combat for nearly 8 months. Given combat performance degrades from the 3-4 month mark, this is an exhausted force which needs rotation. Such rotation was impossible without this partial mobilisation.
The numbers being called up are not sufficient to make any decisive contribution or change the outcome of the war. Ukraine has mobilised many more personnel. This is more about rotation and replacements rather that building some huge new offensive capability for Russia.
Which all tells us a couple of things.
First, Putin and his military privately accept that they could lose this war. The personnel and industrial measures described in the speech are clear indicators of this.
Second, Putin is not stepping away from this war. He has initiated this risky measure in the hope he can prolong the war and out wait western nations, so they tire of supporting Ukraine. So far, this has to worked.
Third, Putin has listened to Xi and Modi last week. He didn’t take away that he shouldn’t be at war. His takeaway was that he must win this or his position relative to China and India will be greatly degraded.
Fourth, western deterrence measures remain important elements of this war. Putin continues to rattle the nuclear sabre in the speech. “In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country …we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us.”
Fifth, it will take some time to raise these reservists and then deploy them to #Ukraine. This means the Ukrainians have an opportunity to continue making progress in their offensives against the Russians.
Finally, Putin’s gamble here prolongs the agony of the Ukrainian people without providing any real chance of a Russian victory. Ultimately this announcement doesn’t change the prospect of a Ukrainian victory. But it means many more people will die before that occurs.
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https://twitter.com/KofmanMichael/status/1572573086490464256 | Thread Reader
| | A few incomplete thoughts on the question of mobilization. It won't solve many of the RU military's challenges in this war, but it could alter the dynamic. Fair to say that these are uncharted waters, and so we should take care with deterministic or definitive claims.
I wouldn't suggest that this can turn around Russia's fortunes in the war. However, I would take care being overly dismissive, especially looking out towards the medium term of this winter and 2023. Force availability and manpower matters, hence the implications can vary.
... [Thread] ...
The second main limitation stems from constraints on force employment. No matter how many personnel are mobilized, RU mil can only sustain and command a finite number of troops on the battlefield. Scaling has been one of the Russian military's chief problems in this war. ...
Morale will continue to be an issue. Stop-loss policies may yield fewer refuseniks, but more deserters. Most UA advantages will remain.
What partial mobilization may do in the coming months, depending on what actually comes of it, is help RU mil stabilize their lines. This is in part why these coming months remain an important window of opportunity for UA to retake territory. Over the winter the contest will likely be one more defined by attrition and reconstitution. The extent to which mobilization can help RU reconstitute is unclear. Mobilization comes with significant political risks and downsides for Moscow, but it could extend Russia's ability to sustain this war more so than alter the outcome.
As always, these are just initial impressions and a very imperfect reading at best.
Perhaps a useful addition - mobilization & stop-loss might help Moscow stem the deteriorating quantity of the force, but not the deteriorating quality of the force & its morale. Having used up its best equipment, officers, & personnel, I don't see how this can be recovered.
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https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1572633601308594176 | Thread Reader
| | @TheStudyofWar agrees with @KofmanMichael that #Russia's partial mobilization is unlikely to change battlefield dynamics rapidly and that #Ukraine retains “an important window of opportunity” in the coming months.
We also agree that #Russia has some limited capacity to induct and train large numbers of reservists; hence the rolling mobilization announced by Russian Minister of Defense Sergei #Shoigu, which we’ll explore in a separate thread. We further concur with @KofmanMichael that the 300k number Shoigu put out is “likely to be notional” and that the final result will likely “be a lot less than what Moscow might expect."
#Putin’s announcement of partial mobilization thus is important and could set conditions for #Russia to maintain its current effort, but it will not reverse the trend of Russian setbacks in the coming months.
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https://twitter.com/MarkHertling/status/1572571676524838915 | Thread Reader
| | Putin's announced mobilization of 300,000 "reservists" was jaw-dropping to me this morning, but not for the reason some might suspect.
Why? Because know how Russian soldiers are trained, in basic training & in their units.
A brief 🧵 on some fun facts.
... | |
https://twitter.com/GresselGustav/status/1572601428220477443 | Thread Reader
| | Dear journalists, I am travelling 4 @ecfr this week. I can't give individual interviews, so here is a 🧵 on what I think about #mobilisation & #nuclearweapons threats.
Mobilisation was rumored for some time, and it is the bigger news. 🇷🇺 occupation forces had issues finding enough personnel for months. Now a lot of contracts from authumn 2021 expire, in November, a lot of 6 month contracts would have expired.
Now would be the time to approach conscripts from last year's authumn draft. They are fully trained, end of service.
However, the #charkiv counter-offensive came right in time to disturb that. Who will join an army that is loosing?
Recruting inmates & others does not provide soldiers in sufficient numbers. If things would have continued the way they were, 🇷🇺 would have lost the war over the winter.
The mobilisation decree first and foremost stopped people leaving by indefinitely prolonging their contracts.
As @KofmanMichael notes this still does not solve morale & training issues ... Most armies that rely on mobilisation, have dedicated reserve force structures: reserve battalions, brigades, TD forces, whatever. Russia does not.
... [Thread] ...
Now, 🇺🇦 armed forces are 700000 men strong, of which roughly 400000 are on the front, the others rotate or are in support functuion.
🇺🇦 gets training assistance from 🇬🇧🇺🇸🇵🇱
Moscow may stabilise the front, but not turn back the tide of war.
What 🇺🇦 needs right now is more havy equipment: tanks, armoured transport, artillery, air defence. Russia still enjoys materiel superiority. Moscow has consistently ignored offers and calls to negotiate, choosing to fight. Now it needs to pay the price for this.
Oh, yes, nukes. Nuclear blackmail was part of it from day one. But they are primarily meant to intimidate and scare. It produced little results. And I hope it will continue not to impress.
The other thing is what real options they have. A single employment will not change the course of the war. Employing a dozend will, but this would come as a much higher price for Russia.
So I don't think it is a real option for now. Only if the army collapses in rapid order he could use one to re-impose him as supreme commander. I think it is more likely in an inward-looking contingency, than in the war itself.
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https://twitter.com/RALee85/status/1572554898201538561 | Thread Reader
| | Thread:
1) There are more unknowns than knowns at this point
2) It is one of the most significant/riskiest political decisions Putin has ever made
3) He is still resisting a broader mobilization
4) It is an acknowledgment that Russia's war was failing and a change had to be made
Much of this depends on how this order is applied. The number of reservists with combat experience is limited, though they may include everyone who deployed to Syria. Shoigu is notoriously unreliable when it comes to figures so don't treat them as fact.
There are two important immediate effects from this order: conscripts currently serving in the Russian military likely will be deployed to fight in Ukraine, and volunteers serving on short contracts will be stop-lossed into continuing to serve.
In the short-term, those two steps could be enough to prevent a collapse of Russian forces. Otherwise, Russia's manpower issues could have become catastrophic this winter when many short-term volunteers likely would not sign another contract.
But the war will now increasingly be fought on the Russian side by people who do not want to be there. The difference in morale, unit cohesion, and other critical factors between Ukrainian and Russian units will grow even greater.
... [Thread] ...
The other important short-term effect is that there are criminal penalties for soldiers who refuse to fight. Considering that this was 20-40% of soldiers in some units, that isn't insignificant. But an involuntary fighting force won't have great long-term prospects.
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https://twitter.com/TimothyDSnyder/status/1572573842115301378 | Thread Reader
| | Putin’s speech demonstrates that Russia is losing. Given casualties and desertions, Putin wants bodies in occupied Ukraine to defend against Ukrainian counter-offensives. That’s pretty much it.
It’s not just Russian forces in Ukraine that are in retreat. Putin himself is clearly afraid. He’s done something he plainly didn’t want to do. Announcing mobilization shows he fears his fascist rivals more than he fears the Russian public.
... [Thread] ...
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https://twitter.com/alexstubb/status/1572534904432349184 | Thread Reader
| | My first reactions to Putin’s speech this morning.
1. We are entering a new phase in the war.
2. Putin is desperate, but take him seriously.
3. We are in this for the long haul - think unpredictable.
A🧵 of five initial questions and conclusions.
...
Why did he say it now?
1. He is in trouble both militarily and politically.
2. Without mobilisation Russia might potentially lose the war.
3. After latest losses - sends message of escalation.
Conclusion: even if bluffing, take him seriously.
How should we react?
1. Cool, calm and collected.
2. General condemnation at the UN, preferably a vote.
3. Do not give in one inch and do not negotiate.
Conclusion: continue to support Ukraine militarily and financially.
Why is he in trouble?
1. Losing respect and support at home.
2. Losing respect among ”supporters” (China and India).
3. Russia becoming increasingly isolated.
Conclusion: he does not understand the phrase ”if you are in hole, stop digging”.
What will happen next?
1. Mobilisation will be slow, takes months.
2. Nuclear option perhaps bluff - alternative cost too high.
3. Prepare for a winter of war.
Conclusion: we are in this for the long haul. Keep in mind that Putin is unpredictable.
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https://twitter.com/J_Kappelmann/status/1572322306654887937 | Thread Reader
| | Heute trenden also #Atomkrieg und #Nuklearwaffen in Deutschland. Ich forsche dazu und tweete ausnahmsweise mal auf deutsch- und versuche ein paar Punkte zusammenzufassen: 🧵
tldnr: die Gefahr eines bewussten Einsatzes ist aktuell sehr gering - auszuschließen aber niemals. Ob und wie wir die Ukraine unterstützen ändert nichts daran, dass ein Einsatz für Putin sehr irrational wäre- wir sollten daher unserer moralischen Verantwortung folgen& mehr Waffen & Kampfpanzer an die Ukraine zu liefern.
Nuklearwaffen zu haben ist nicht rational, für niemanden, daher brauchen wir jetzt auch Bekenntnisse für nukleare Abrüstung - wie sie bereits aus vielen Regionen der Welt kommen.
Let’s go:
...
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https://mobile.twitter.com/noclador/status/1572389840007892992 | Thread Reader
| | Why are russian propagandists and the Kremlin so afraid of ATACMS missiles... is it a fear of striking deep into russia? is it a fear of striking symbolic targets?
No, it's all about logistics. A thread 🧵:
russian military logistics are a disaster: no forklifts, no pallets, too few trucks, bad maintenance, corruption, incompetence, no movement control units - without access to a railroad russia can't supply its troops. ...
The only way for russia to somehow keep its logistics alive are railroads. For russia no access to a railroad equals failure of an operation:
attack towards Kyiv from the East - no railroad = no supplies, troops starving, tanks without fuel, no ammo - disaster, then retreat.
The moment Ukrainian troops arrived outside Kupiansk, russian troops fled from Izyum, as without the railyard at Kupiansk there was no chance to supply the Izyum salient.
With the flight from Kharkiv russia is now down to two fronts:
• East: Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts
• South: Zaporizhzhia, Kherson and Crimea oblasts
... [Thread] ...
The Southern front: colored in blue the main supply lines and in yellow GMLRS ranges, which force russia to unload trains far from the front.
... This means the ONLY way for russia to supply its 70,000 troops on the Southern front is by rail over the Kerch bridge. russia neither has the trucks nor the drivers to supply its Southern front by road. There is only one lifeline and it runs over two bridges and if ATACMS takes these two bridges out - russia can't hold the South.
Especially with winter fast approaching - because soon russia will not have to transport food for 70,000+ troops, millions of liters of fuel, 100s of tons of ammo, spares and supplies to the South every day, it will also have to supply 100s of tons of heating material every day.
russian forces in Kherson on the right bank of the Dnipro are already running low on ammo, fuel, food, spares, replacement tanks, etc. because the bridges over the Dnipro have been taken out by GMLRs. But those are just 20,000 troops and trucks have to drive only 100 km to pick up supplies - imagine what happens when it is 70,000 troops, 400+ km of distance from rostov-on-don and it is winter.
This is why russia's dictator and his goons are so scared of ATACMS.
...
And don't worry: the Kerch bridge isn't in russia. ... Hitting the Kerch railbridge would devastate putin's ability to wage war in the South of Ukraine.
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https://twitter.com/DmitryOpines/status/1572541943514824705
| | I'm no more eager to die in nuclear fire than anyone else.
However, I just don't see how the world can function with a precedent whereby Russia can unilaterally declare it has annexed territory thrice the size of Belgium and forestall resistance through nuclear extortion.
It's legitimate to be concerned about Putin's use of nukes. Of course it is. It's a terrifying prospect and I'd gently suggest those hoping the Russian arsenal won't work are being overly optimistic.
However, there simply must be limits to how the threat shapes our policies.
Western leaders are already factoring the Russian nuclear deterrent into their thinking and decisions.
Russian nukes are why the skies over Ukraine aren't swarming with Predator Drones and F-35's.
Avoiding a direct confrontation is prudent caution.
Appeasement is folly.
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https://twitter.com/AFP/status/1572549954064642048
| | China has called for a "ceasefire through dialogue and consultation", following Russian President Vladimir Putin's address on Ukraine in which he announced a partial military mobilisation.
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Gegen den Krieg protestieren wollen? Ab in den Krieg:
https://twitter.com/SamRamani2/status/1572511869033943041
| | | Russian media is warning that participants in "illegal rallies" will be subjected to military conscription | |
https://twitter.com/MCTothSTL/status/1572634106009198593
| | Putin's 'benefits' for his newly conscripted reservists are not what a #Russian Army that's getting badly mauled in #Ukraine needs on their recruiting posters.
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https://twitter.com/ianbremmer/status/1572576881391521792
| | searches for ‘how to break an arm’ surged in russia today
anything to get out of combat…
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https://twitter.com/yanamrzv/status/1572539876817670147
| | Russians panicking about mobilization 7 months into the war is fascinating to me. Did you not know your country started the bloodiest war in Europe since WWII? Were you really hoping to not be personally affected by it at all? You thought only minorities would be sent to die?
The prospect of having you or people you love die in war hits different huh
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https://twitter.com/jenssiegert/status/1572611438883262464
| | The first question today, if talking or writing to Russian friends, is always: Are you (if male) or is Dima/Sasha/Mitya/Lyosha/Wolodya (if related) liable to military service?
The second (when the answer is yes): How you/he will avoid to be conscripted?
Whether anyone involved in this conversation is supporting Putin and the war or not, doesn't matter at all. Nobody wants to go.
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https://twitter.com/ASLuhn/status/1572612105265885196
https://mobile.twitter.com/wartranslated/status/1572608312298053632
| | A @navalny activist posing as a military official asks Nikolai Peskov, son of Putin's spokesman, to report to the draft office.
"You should undersand, if I'm Mr Peskov, it's not entirely correct for me to be there," Peskov says. "I'm going to resolve this at a different level" 🤝
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https://twitter.com/WarMonitor3/status/1572555336900579329
| | Several train columns of T62-M tanks were seen heading towards Donbas regions.
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Wenn das so weiter geht, holen sie bald die T-34 raus...
https://twitter.com/juli_anh/status/1572637587625627649
| | Aus Sicht der Ukraine hätte gar nichts besseres passieren können als diese Mobilmachung. Millionen Russinnen und Russen, die sich nie für Politik interessiert haben, suchen jetzt im Internet nach Antworten, warum ihre Söhne, Ehemänner, Brüder in den Tod geschickt werden sollen.
Die Illusion, man könne einigermaßen unbehelligt leben, wenn man sich nur schön raushält und ab und zu ein bisschen Patriotismus simuliert, wurde heute zerstört.
Was Russinnen und Russen im Internet über den Krieg erfahren können? Alles. Habe das hier mal aufgeschrieben
Medien in Russland: Die atomisierte Öffentlichkeit | Zeit
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https://twitter.com/ennolenze/status/1572656382503157760
| | | „Haben gerade in [Hafen in ost-russland] angelegt um aufzutanken und manche Leute hier bieten uns 100.000$ in Cash damit wir sie mitnehmen und ablegen.“ - schreibt mir ein Bekannter. | |
https://twitter.com/IAPonomarenko/status/1572596628074250244
| | | What is happening is a terrible thing, but in all seriousness get yourself prepared to witness the world’s biggest shitshow — the mayhem and horror of general mobilization in Russia. | |
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[Dieser Beitrag wurde 4 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Herr der Lage am 21.09.2022 21:24]
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Was ist das für ein Stoffband das man vor dem Feuern wegmachen soll?
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Ein Stoffband, das fest mit irgendetwas verbunden ist was beim Feuern nicht mehr drin sein sollte. Hoffe ich konnte helfen.
Spoiler - markieren, um zu lesen:
In der Regel werden mit solchen Fahnen Sicherungsstifte, Abdeckungen und dergleichen Transport-/Lagerungssicherungen einigermaßen unübersehbar markiert. Vgl. "remove before flight" an irgendwelchen Staurohrkappen U.Ä.
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[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Abso am 21.09.2022 22:30]
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| | Zitat von Bullitt
Was ist das für ein Stoffband das man vor dem Feuern wegmachen soll?
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Schützt den größeren Ring am Geschoss, der in die Züge im Lauf gepresst wird.
Führungsband/ring
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Dies
Der ist nämlich aus (relativer) Butter
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| | Zitat von Sentinel2150
| | Zitat von [Muh!]Shadow
Glaubst man dass Asow-Menschen, gerade aus der symbolträchtigen Schlacht, so lange in russischer Gefangenschaft aushalten würden?
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Die sind ja ziemlich großes Faustpfand. Daher ja. Bis auf die, die man halt umgebracht hat und dann behauptet hat, die Ukrainer hätten das Gefangenlager bombardiert
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Propagandatechnisch wäre das freilassen der Asow Soldaten aber wieder einfach dumm von Russland. Waren das doch DIE Nazitruppen für die Russen.
Aber über Sinn oder Logik braucht man sich da eigentlich gar nicht mehr aufregen.
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Toll, dass man noch Menschen da raus bekommt. Schöne Nachricht.
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Die russischen Telegramgruppen schäumen vor Wut
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ach, in 3 Monaten erinnern sie sich daran und wollen, dass man im Gegenzug die Russen austauscht, die sich dann in dem Werk vor den anrückenden Ukrainern verstecken. 
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Die CDU-Fraktion will anscheinend einen Antrag zur Lieferung von Panzern stellen, gibts da ne Quelle zu?
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| Thema: Allgemeine Diskussion zum Ukraine Krieg |
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![AUP [Muh!]Shadow 10.03.2015](./avatare/upload/U50324--muhshadownewversion3kyhuza.png)
