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Gouda!
/Neue Seite für sonen Käse.
*badum tss*
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[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von -=Q=- 8-BaLL am 30.09.2022 21:31]
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Mies einen getankt der Typ ...
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Kontext:
Ivan der Schreckliche (Nikita Romanov)
| | Thus we have no information whatsoever about the reasons that brought about the execution of Prince Peter Serebriany on July 20. He had been one of the heroes of the battle for Kazan and was highly respected in the Boyar Council. It was known that for some weeks he had been in disfavor. Quite possibly in an unguarded moment he had protested against the crimes committed in Novgorod and Pskov. Ivan’s method of execution was unusual. He ordered Maliuta Skuratov to go to the prince’s residence, hack off his head, and bring it back to the Oprichnina Palace in Moscow, where he was then staying. Maliuta Skuratov did as he was told. The prince’s head was cut off in his own courtyard. Maliuta Skuratov ran to the palace and laid the head at Ivan’s feet, saying, “Tsar, the work you commanded me to do has been done!” The Tsar exclaimed, “Goida!” and all the oprichnikiHe urged the around him shouted in chorus.
A day or two later Ivan ordered the execution of a hundred and sixty-five Polish and Lithuanian prisoners. They were being held in three towers, apparently within the confines of the Oprichnina Palace. According to the chroniclers there were fifty-five prisoners in each tower and Ivan himself superintended the executions and killed the first two prisoners by thrusting a long spear through the bars. He was attempting to kill a third, bungled it and gave the job to his son, the Tsarevich Ivan, who had no difficulty killing adefenseless prisoner. These killings were acts of imbecile brutality and ferocity, all the more inexplicable because only a few days before Ivan had signed a three-year truce with the Polish and Lithuanian ambassadors. | |
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Wenn deine Propagandisten Ivan den Schrecklichen zitieren.
Are we the baddies?
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| | Zitat von Poliadversum
Are we the baddies?
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J@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
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Wie Kindergarten mit Totmachen.
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| | Zitat von AJ Alpha
Wie Kindergarten mit Totmachen.
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Wer hat angefangen?
Fragt unsere Anruferin Sahra Wagenprecht
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Alter
Nachtmahrwerkstoff.
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Stümmt. Aber das eigentliche Problem hat Putin ja angesprochen in seiner Rede, es ist nicht das Bild, es sind die Pronomen.
/
| | Jake Sullivan: Ukraine's NATO status should be taken up "at a different time."
2 U.S. officials told me today that Ukraine's announcement came as a surprise. | |
https://twitter.com/alexbward/status/1575929108873490432
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[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von -=Q=- 8-BaLL am 30.09.2022 23:29]
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Kommt es nur mir so vor, dass er innerlich aufatmet, dass die Leute halbwegs mitmachen und es nicht so wie bei Infantino abgelaufen ist?
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https://twitter.com/ABaerbock/status/1575934757824860160
| | Die Scheinreferenden sind ein halbherziger Versuch, über das hinweg zu täuschen, was wir seit einem halben Jahr erleben: einen brutalen Landraub. Diesen schwersten Bruch der UN-Charta werden wir niemals anerkennen. Wir werden die #Ukraine weiter verantwortungsvoll unterstützen.
| |
Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs
https://twitter.com/SweMFA/status/1575770155346710529
| | | Crimea is Ukraine. Donetsk is Ukraine. Kherson is Ukraine. Luhansk is Ukraine. Zaporizhzhia is Ukraine. Sweden continues to #StandwithUkraine | |
https://twitter.com/trussliz/status/1575799477037850625
| | Vladimir Putin is once again violating international law with his threats to annex more of Ukraine.
We will not hesitate to take further action, including imposing more sanctions to cripple Putin’s war machine.
We will ensure he loses this illegal war.
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https://twitter.com/olliecarroll/status/1575566520511594508
| | Interesting interview with Ukraine's ambassador to US here. The ban on firing into Russia only applies to Himars systems. And, no, Crimea isn't covered.
(Almost certainly also applies to the other GMLRS Ukraine has been given.)
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https://twitter.com/lilygrutcher/status/1575943248375255040
| | Joe Biden: "We will give Ukraine the weapons it needs to recapture all its territories."
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https://twitter.com/mhmck/status/1575971495435636737
| | It's 1 a.m. in Ukraine and there's a battle underway on the outskirts of Kreminna, Luhansk region.
Advancing Ukrainian troops are turning the Russian retreat from Lyman, Donetsk region, into a rout.
Sounds near Kreminna tonight
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https://twitter.com/AAndrusov/status/1575925678330945536
| | Ukrainian loudspeakers demand that Russians surrender in Lyman. "Your government doesn't need you. For them, you are cannon fodder. Your loved ones need you at home."
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https://twitter.com/DefMon3/status/1575974054712217600
| | Stavky liberated.
This guy says the AFU has entered Lyman, they control a part of it. I have a geolocation with medium confidence.
This video is supposedly from Kreminna today.
Brothers morale very low.
Tranlsation: "That's it blyat, all fucked. Met the guys just now, the last ones. Nobody in front blyat. Not the 208th, nobody. Fa**ots blyat. Not ours, not those who lost people here. Everybody knows where the fa**ots are [Shoigu? lmao]."
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https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1575848073846312960
| | "The collapse of the [Russian] pocket around #Lyman may allow - depending on how Ukrainian forces decide to pursue further gains - to unhinge this line and open up potential further advances east," ISW's @KarolinaAHird tells @JonathanLanday.
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https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1575859322713784321
| | September 29 Assessment Highlight:
The bureaucratic failures in the #Russian partial mobilization may indicate that #Putin has again bypassed the Russian higher military command or the Russian MoD.
#Belarus may be preparing to accommodate newly-mobilized #Russian servicemen but remains unlikely to enter the war in #Ukraine on Russia’s behalf.
https://isw.pub/RusCampaignSept29
Belarus remains highly unlikely to become directly involved in the war in Ukraine on the part of Russia, despite statements made by Ukrainian sources on September 29 that Belarus is preparing to accommodate newly mobilized Russian servicemen.
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https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1575916730643537920
| | New assessment: #Putin renewed his attempt to compel #Ukraine to negotiate a ceasefire by again threatening to use tactical nuclear weapons. He is likely aiming to scare the West into pressuring Ukraine into a ceasefire, which he will use to rearm. 🧵
http://isw.pub/PutinNuclearThreats
@TheStudyofWar cannot predict if or when #Putin will use a nuclear weapon. His latest threats are not fundamentally new nor indicate imminent preparation for their use. The crossing of Putin’s stated red lines in #Ukraine has thus far not triggered threatened nuclear use.
#Putin is most likely to employ a nuclear weapon if he believes it will not draw direct Western conventional military intervention and if he believes it can have decisive effects within #Ukraine.
#Putin's desire for negotiations indicates that he assesses he cannot win this war with the forces he has and can field quickly and must instead freeze the conflict in #Ukraine in order to buy time to regroup.
It is unclear what indicators #Putin will use to assess the success of his two primary efforts to salvage the situation in #Ukraine: (1) force generation and (2) attempting to break western resolve through economic pressure.
Both efforts are likely to fail but #Putin may take more time to observe their effects before deciding on a new course of action.
At best, #Putin could hope that a tactical nuclear escalation would force a freeze of current front lines. It would be an astonishing gamble given the costs NATO can – and must – impose in retaliation.
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| | This should be at both top and bottom of your assessment.
“The more confident Putin is that nuclear use will not achieve decisive effects but will draw direct Western conventional military intervention in the conflict, the less likely he is to conduct a nuclear attack.” | |
https://twitter.com/AndrKolesnikov/status/1575854333173940231
| | Putin's speech is a set of unbelievably illiterate conspiracy clichés that 30 years ago could be read in marginal national-patriotic newspapers. Now it has become the policy of the former superpower, which even in the days of the Soviet leaders could not afford such a discourse.
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https://twitter.com/WarintheFuture/status/1575967494657179648 | Thread Reader
| | Today’s speech by Putin is a milestone in the Russo-Ukraine War. It may be useful for Putin in a domestic politics sense. But, as has been the case throughout this war, it is terrible strategy for Russia. A thread on the implications of Putin’s latest ‘bold’ move.
...
The principle audience for the speech was the domestic one. Putin used the speech as a war update, with the message that Russian progress so far is significant, securing 4 regions of Ukraine to return to the Russian motherland.
Another audience was Russia’s military leaders. In essence, Putin said “I have given you this great and historic mission, so sort your act out with mobilisation and get on with deploying more soldiers to Ukraine.”
And, Putin probably believes that this speech will be well-received in certain, non-aligned parts of the world including South Asia and Africa, who still buy his energy and other products. He might be right.
But what does this mean for the course of war in #Ukraine? There are multiple impacts of Putin’s new - and flawed - strategy.
1) First, it is another demonstration of Putin’s inability to align his desired political outcomes with the capacity of his military. This has been a characteristic of the war from day one. The Russian military is incapable of achieving what Putin has directed it to do.
Even the scaled back strategic objective of liberating the Donbas, announced in Putin’s 9 May speech, has proven beyond the Russian military. This expanded approach, encompassing 4 provinces, is likely to be well beyond Russian military capacity to seize or hold.
So, Putin has actually set himself up for failure in this regard alone. He has set out large objectives, which his military are unlikely to achieve, which will place further strain on his credibility and that of the Russian military. It is terrible strategy.
2) A second impact is that this will encourage Ukraine to step up its efforts to take back its territory illegally seized by Russia. So far, it is doing a pretty good job of this and battlefield momentum is currently with the Ukrainians.
Ukraine, with its strategy of corrosion, has out fought and out thought the Russians throughout this war. They have brilliantly used the indirect approach to destroy Russian units and morale. And they have magnificently applied the operational art in sequencing campaigns.
As a consequence of Putin’s announcement, the Ukrainians have reinvigorated purpose. We should expect to see offensives continue, including (maybe at a slower pace) through the winter. And resistance attacks in annexed areas will increase. But the continuation of Ukrainian tactical and operational success also relies of the continuation of western support. This leads to the third impact.
3) Putin has given the west greater reason to support Ukraine. This illegal land grab goes against the all principles of self-determination and democracy. And it sets a terrible precedent for behaviour by large states - this can’t be allowed to stand.
4) Fourth, Putin has continued his campaign to normalize the potential use of nuclear weapons. His reference to US use of nuclear weapons in WW2 as a precedent means he may see them as a final option to prevent a catastrophic loss in Ukraine. And to deter further NATO support.
5) Fifth, Putin is continuing his ‘energy warfare’ against Europe. His speech again asked Europeans why they support the war, noting that “Europe have to convince their fellow citizens to eat less, take a shower less often and dress warmer at home.”
6) A final impact of the speech is it shows that there is no negotiated end to this war in the near future. Putin stated that the future of the 4 provinces will not be discussed. Coupled with mobilisation, Putin has painted himself into a corner. He now has to win this war.
This makes him probably even more dangerous. But it will also result in greater pressure on the Russian economy and on Russian society. The ultimate impact of this is unpredictable - but unlikely to be good. A good piece on this is from @anneapplebaum
Putin’s Newest Annexation Is Dire for Russia Too
Putin may also give the west no option but to further increase its aid to Ukraine. And, possibly, new consideration of Ukrainian entry into #NATO. Putin’s war and annexation nearly guarantees what he sought to prevent by invading Ukraine.
The other irony of the speech is that it comes as Ukraine is about to capture #Lyman & show its military prowess again by humiliating the Russian Army. It is another demonstration of Putin’s constant incapacity to align his political desires with military capacity. And if the ‘professional’ Russian military that has been trained and re-equipped over the last decade can’t prevail in Ukraine, it is extraordinarily unlikely that a mass of conscripts with just weeks of training will provide a solution to Putin’s territory aspirations.
So Putin’s speech marks a more dangerous phase of the war, because he has shown himself to be more desperate. But the annexations, and mobilisations, are unlikely to change ultimate outcome of this war.
Because, there is little else that Putin can do to Ukraine he has not already done. City destruction, rape, torture, murder, annexation and nuclear threats have not cowed the Ukrainians. They continue to show how a free people can defeat authoritarians. Take note Xi!
The trajectory of the war remains for an eventual Ukrainian victory. But Putin’s recent announcements mean that #Ukraine winning this war will take longer, and have a much higher price - for Ukraine and Russia. End.
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https://twitter.com/DrRadchenko/status/1576067633254117376
| | Some final thoughts on Putin's speech. Unsurprisingly, it was directed almost exclusively at the domestic audience. It had a dual purpose: 1) to distract from mounting problems (military failures, chaotic mobilisation, economic difficulties) and 2) to whip up toxic nationalism.
I would be very cautious in making any judgments about how successful it was on either of these points. I am sure there is a certain constituency in Russia who embrace this rhetoric but in my view but we'd need proper surveys to gauge the public reaction. I see weariness.
The one bit of the speech that was directed to the outside was the supposedly inadvertent aside about Hiroshima having set a precedent. I would not be worried much about this. None of this commentary in any way erodes basic deterrence postures. It's a form of cheap signalling.
So, on the whole, the speech doesn't matter. Ukraine continues to make advances in the east, and this speaks louder than any unhinged pontification on Putin's part. He sought to project strength but he looks weak, increasingly weak.
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https://twitter.com/Flash_news_ua/status/1575867238829391872
| | Great Britain has banned Russia from accessing the services of its engineering, architectural, auditing, legal and advertising companies, – the British Foreign Ministry reports.
The agency added that the number of categories of goods whose export to Russia is prohibited has reached 700.
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https://twitter.com/JamesSpenceley/status/1576004098733658112
| | Huge turn out in Lugansk for the celebration/announcement they’ve been “annexed” by Russia.
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https://twitter.com/oliverdasgupta/status/1575717787737399297
| | Heute vor 84 Jahren erlaubten Großbritannien und Frankreich dem deutschen Diktator #Hitler, Teile Tschechiens zu annektieren. Motiv: Man wollte Frieden. Wie das ausging, ist bekannt.
#Appeasement funktioniert nicht, weder damals noch heute.
https://spiegel.de/geschichte/die-sudetenkrise-a-947880.html
Apropos Appeasement 👇
| | Dringende Empfehlung an alle Appeasement-Anhänger, die #Putin-Rede genau zu studieren. Darin ging es kaum um den Krieg gegen die Ukraine. Sondern ausschließlich um die Feindschaft gegen den "kollektiven Westen"
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https://twitter.com/denistrubetskoy/status/1575934271378034689
| | Eine kleine Botschaft am Ende des Freitags: Jeder, der noch an Verhandlungen, Geschäfte und was auch immer mit Putin glaubt, sollte sich seine heutige Rede in voller Länger anschauen. Wenn auch das nicht hilft, hilft überhaupt nichts mehr.
An dieser Stelle schöne Grüße an Ernst, Varwick, Wagenknecht und wie die alle heißen.
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https://twitter.com/LostWeapons/status/1575956099794374656
| | What are we at like excuse number 5 for why Russia has to invaded Ukraine.
They gave up on the nazi angle pretty early
Then Ukraine was going to nuke Russia
Then US bio labs creating anti Russian birds or some shit
Now it’s trans people
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https://twitter.com/IntelDoge/status/1575978181424664576
| | Ukrainians using a BMP-1 at a ballistic trajectory (with correction coming from a drone and Kropiva (Nettle) targeting software). Not the first time the Ukrainians have fired weapons guided by UAV, surprisingly effective.
The BMP-1 fires either the OG-15V round with the OG-9MZ FRAG-HE grenade (first image) or the PG-15V High Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) round (second image), both 73mm.
Seen here, footage from Eastern Ukraine, September 2022, a thermal imaging drone from KRAKEN, guides indirect tank fire towards Russian positions.
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https://twitter.com/UAWeapons/status/1575843498217144321
| | #Ukraine: Ukraine received new rockets for HIMARS/M270- here we can see a pod of M30A1 guided rockets.
M30A1 differs from previously seen M31A1/A2 by an alternative warhead with 182000 preformed spheroid steel/tungsten fragments and is designed to be used against soft targets.
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| | > Amazing find by @UAWeapons
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Shows that the US is helping Ukraine get rid of all those mobilized russians in the quickest way possible. | |
| | > Russia, meet the American replacement for cluster munitions.
Giving M30A1 to Ukraine means that the US is reasonably sure 🇷🇺 is running low on heavy armored vehicles, and will be in static defense positions. 🇷🇺’s infantry is toast.
Old pictures of expended M30A1 for reference.
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| | > Precise, fast, accurate and brutal - here is a Lockheed Martin video showing how these rocket with 182,000 pre-formed tungsten fragments shred everything.
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https://twitter.com/KyivIndependent/status/1575865770634276870
| | Finland shuts border for Russian tourists.
The decision cuts off the last easily accessible route for Russians with Schengen tourist visas into Europe. Earlier this month, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland imposed entry restrictions for Russian citizens.
Finland cited Russia’s full-scale war, its sham “referendums” in Ukraine, Finland's national security, and the sabotage of the Nord Stream pipelines as reasons for its decision.
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https://twitter.com/SamRamani2/status/1575819358903099393
| | | [Russian political scientist] Sergei Karaganov says that he is 99% sure that the U.S. will not retaliate if Russia launched a nuclear strike on a NATO country that supports Ukraine | |
https://twitter.com/maiyajambalaya/status/1575208253071720450
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[Dieser Beitrag wurde 9 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Herr der Lage am 01.10.2022 9:46]
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Es ist ja völlig wurst wie Kindergarten das jetzt ist, problem wird sein das er als nächstes behaupten wird - wenn die Ukrainer versuchen sollten die annektierten Gebiete zurückzuerobern - das ja russisches Terretorium angegriffen werden würde.
Ist ja scheißegal was der Westen jetzt davon hält oder nicht, in seinem Land kann er die ganze Kiste jetzt in eine lächerliche Defensivreaktion umstülpen.
Ich kenn mich bei den Russen in der Hinsicht nicht so aus, würde ein Angriff auf Russland andere militärische Mittel eher legitimieren als es die bisherige "militärische Spezialoperation" täte?
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| | Zitat von -=Q=- 8-BaLL
Was ist mit den Leuten?
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[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von eupesco am 01.10.2022 4:53]
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| | Zitat von Lord Nighthawk
Ich kenn mich bei den Russen in der Hinsicht nicht so aus, würde ein Angriff auf Russland andere militärische Mittel eher legitimieren als es die bisherige "militärische Spezialoperation" täte?
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Ja, theoretisch könnte Putin Wehrpflichtige einsetzen, da russisches Gebiet, zudem könnte man die Bevölkerung in den besetzten Gebieten mobilisieren. Das ist in Luhansk und Donezk eh schon passiert und bei den südlichen Provinzen vielleicht keine gute Idee, wenn man sich deren Haltung zu Russland anschaut.
Es könnten nach den berühmten roten Linien auch Nuklearwaffen eingesetzt werden, da nun die "Integrität der Föderation gefährdet ist", aber das ist eben auch nur Rhetorik. Putin musste schon von seiner anti-Einmischungstaktik zurücktreten bei der jede Einmischung des Westens eine nukleare Antwort gehabt hätte.
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How Many Tanks Does Russia Have Left Now? With Exclusive Satellite Imagery!
Video beginnt ab 1:45min, vorher Werbegedöns.
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[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von DeChOsEn am 01.10.2022 10:34]
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tl;dw: Man weiß es nicht. Es gibt Abgänge aus den per Satellit sichtbaren Depots, die unter, aber im Bereich der Oryx-bestätigten Abschusszahlen liegen. Er vermutet, dass ihnen deutlich eher die (kompetenten) Besetzungen ausgehen als die Panzer.
Er geht nicht darauf ein, inwiefern die optisch intakten Panzer tatsächlich auch ready for action sind, bzw. inwiefern aus drei kaputten ein funktionsfähiger zusammengebaut wird. Er trifft auch keine Aussage dazu, was in den Hallen passieren könnte, ob es dort Abgänge, Zugänge oder Stillstand gibt.
Es ist "nur" eine Analyse von kommerziell verfügbaren Satellitenbildern.
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Hier das komplette Video:
GMLRS Alternative Warhead Engineer & Manufacturing Development Phase Test & Evaluation
| | | Video showing tests of GMLRS Alternative Warhead presented by U.S. Army Col. Gary Stephens, Precision Fires Rocket and Missile Systems Project Manager at the National Defense Industry Association's 2015 Precision Strike Annual Review (PSAR-15). | |
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Sollte auf jedem russischen Handy laufen, damit jeder Soldat sehen kann in welchen Meatgrinder er geraten ist. Ist die passende Antwort auf TOS-1 und Co.
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Punkt 3 macht mich stutzig. Sicher würde es den Konflikt beenden, wenn man den Zorn der anderen Atommächte entfesselt. Das steht aber im direkten Widerspruch zu Punkt 2.
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Ich würde auch hoffen dass da in der Befehlskette genug Leute sind die selbst wenn Putin so denkt sagen "Ja ne du ich hab Kinder".
Davon abgesehen lag Galeev auch schon öfter mal daneben wenn er Putins Aktionen vorhersagen wollte. Aber dass man das überhaupt so framen kann hat mich überrascht.
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"American retaliatory strike", auf was für ein Ziel? In Russland? Ich glaube das würde, ob der Spirale die dann losgehen kann, nicht passieren
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| | Zitat von Aspe
"American retaliatory strike", auf was für ein Ziel? In Russland? Ich glaube das würde, ob der Spirale die dann losgehen kann, nicht passieren
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Muss in seiner Argumentation kein nuklearer Schlag sein, wenn Russland durch USA/NATO konventionell abgefertigt wird (er nimmt als Beispiel die Zerstörung der Schwarzmeerflotte) gibt das schon genug Ansatzpunkte um den Rückzug als "Sieg" verkaufen zu können.
e/ versteht mich nicht falsch, für mich macht das auch keinen Sinn. Aber ich hab akzeptiert dass ich die "russische Psyche" for lack of a better word ohnehin nicht verstehe.
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[Dieser Beitrag wurde 2 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von Poliadversum am 01.10.2022 12:00]
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| | Russian troops encircled in Lyman day after annexation ceremony
Ukrainian troops recaptured villages near Lyman and encircled the city, Serhiy Cherevaty, spokesman for the Ukrainian armed forces, told The Washington Post on Saturday. A pro-Kremlin separatist leader in eastern Ukraine said Friday that the city was “semi-encircled,” describing Kyiv’s advances as “very unpleasant news.” | |
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/09/30/russia-ukraine-war-latest-updates/
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Wait. Poli jetzt mit nuklearthreat postings? 'hoffen wir Mal'???
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| | Zitat von h3llfir3
Wait. Poli jetzt mit nuklearthreat postings? 'hoffen wir Mal'???
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Soll ich dir jetzt erklären warum dieses Gedankenexperiment von Galeev mehr Relevanz hat als deine uninformierten SPD-Parteibuch-Doompostings oder kommst du selber drauf?
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Ja bitte mach dir die Mühe 
'aber die Doktrin!!'
Ernsthaft: ich find's ja gut, dass du jetzt auch langsam schnallst, dass an Putins handeln nichts rationales zu finden ist und auch nuklear Gedankenspiele bei dem Typen irgendwie möglich sind.
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[Dieser Beitrag wurde 1 mal editiert; zum letzten Mal von h3llfir3 am 01.10.2022 12:29]
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Ne danke
Kannst du nicht einfach deinen Rand halten? Du bist ungefähr bei 0,7 Riddick momentan
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| Thema: Allgemeine Diskussion zum Ukraine Krieg |
![AUP [Skeletor] 15.01.2024](./avatare/upload/U1056931--vodoousdtb.png)
